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Animal rehabilitationan exercise in the practice of biodiversity
and a tool for conservation
Gisela Kaplan

Introduction

O

n a recent trip that I took to town, the roads were deserted
and a family of woodducks was walking near the edge of
the road. Ten minutes later I returned and one dead
woodduck was in the middle of the road. As ducks
generally walk slowly across the road, it was easy to assume that the
driver of a car had, maliciously, failed to slow down for them. The
driver had further failed to stop after hitting the duck, not knowing
perhaps that the whole family would gather around the dead one
and thereby risk death from other reckless drivers. I picked up the
duck. It was still warm and carried it off the road. As all of the ducks
followed, I placed it near a pond, as far away from the road as
possible. Another unnecessary death had occurred and another
social fabric of an animal species disrupted. The damage was not just
done to one but in this case to several members of the species. Had
the duck been alive and not too badly injured it would have been
taken into care and then released back into the same group.
Of late, topics of rehabilitation and release of wildlife have come
under a good deal of scrutiny in Australia. Some have argued that
rehabilitation is a waste of time. The recent article by Glenn Albrecht
in Animal Issues 1 spoke of the many shortcomings of rehabilitation
and it is partly to this paper that I wish to respond, although this is
taken largely as a starting point to the general debate about

1
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reintroduction, captive breeding and rehabilitation of native
Australian wildlife.
The human species has inflicted severe damage on its environment
and on other species. In 1981 Special Survival Plans (SSPs) were set
up by the International Union for the Conservation of National
Species Survival Commissions (IUCN/SSC). At that time, 75 species
were listed as endangered and the list has grown ever since.
Inevitably, the desire to save species from extinction has led to
detailed discussions and research on how best to achieve this.
There have been many successes in protecting wildlife both at
individual and species levels, ranging from howler monkeys in
Berlize, to the Californian condor, to the European peregrine falcon
and to the South African vulture programs. A few of the projects
have been so successful that they have even caused a glut of the
species. 2 To argue at any level that rehabilitation (including
restocking, translocation, and captive breeding) is futile or
unsuccessful is to miss the point about what can be done and has
already been achieved.
Activities have occurred in all areas of rehabilitation. One is
restocking (replenishment of existing stock of species), another
reintroduction (reintroducing a species to an area that was known to
have been home to a specific species before but had disappeared)
and a third common method is translocation (taking species from
one area to another). These activities are by their very nature often
projects of some magnitute. They usually concern species that are
vulnerable or endangered; although intentional translocations (over
700 in new world English speaking countries between 1973 and
1986) also included many game species for sporting purposes. 3 There
are cases in which a species may become overabundant in one small
pocket while, through its natural habitat range, it has actually
become rare and vulnerable.

C.D. Ankney, ‘An embarrassment of riches: Too many geese’, Journal of Wildlife
Management , 60, (1996), pp. 217-223.
3 B. Griffith, J. M. Scott, et al., ‘Translocation as a species conservation tool: Status
and strategy.’ Science , 245, (1989), pp. 477-480.
2
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Rehabilitation of individuals belonging to a species currently
classified as abundant may occur also. We should not overlook this
category. Admittedly, it is more dramatic to speak about saving a
species at risk of extinction than about saving animals which are
abundant or common. Why would one want to save an animal of a
species that is plentiful? First, if our concerns focus only on the thin
end of the wedge, we would have no mechanisms in place to prevent
species from sliding into the risk zone in the first place. Second, we
need to stop and ask the humane question: Why ask such a question
at all? We do not stop treating humans for ailments, fractures and
diseases because of their abundance. The value ranking of species
according to numbers and known stock is a dangerous game. It may
be temporarily unavoidable as we recognise the urgency for some
specific species and specific ecosystems such as wetlands. However,
pragmatism itself can create value hierarchies and pave the ground
for a particular ethics, i.e. it is possible to associate 'urgency' with
value and to attribute value only to things that are rare. Ultimately,
such conclusions would be extremely detrimental to biodiversity.
There is no doubt that the last two decades have set all those
concerned on a steep learning curve. Mistakes have been plentiful
and some efforts perhaps even woefully inadequate. Also,
controversy has surrounded some projects and ideas. However, it is
clear that over this timespan, we, collectively, have gained a much
clearer perspective on strategies, legislature, project planning and
complexity. This article embraces at least a cautious optimism that
we are beginning to see successes that are worth noting. It deals with
some of the controversies and issues.

Assessing the state of species
There are assessment criteria available before any rehabilitation,
reintroduction or translocation of wildlife is commenced and these
should be used (see Table 1 below). This checklist, which according
to Jeffrey M. Black, contains vital information on which rational
decisions for the release of wildlife can be made 4, falls into four main

J.M. Black, ‘Threatened Waterfowl: Recovery priorities and reintroduction
potential with special reference to the Hawaiian Goose’, in Avian Conservation.

4
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domains: testing biopolitical conditions, environmental conditions,
resources and the condition of the species involved. Our
preparedness to follow through on such an assessment is often
counteracted by lack of funds, limited by political will and
circumscribed by scientific knowledge of the species or of the
context. Moreover, behaviour of the species is all too often
underrated as an important, if not vital, component in achieving
successful outcomes in diagnosis and release. And preempting a
later point, one might have to concede that the term 'success' is itself
in need of definition and by no means an agreed upon standard.
Ideally, in any attempt of reintroduction of a species, even in
translocation exercises, all four assessment criteria for a given
species should be thoroughly known and evaluated. Unfortunately,
this is not always possible. Sometimes it is a lack of understanding of
the need to make such viability assessments.

Table 1
Human Preparedness
Condition of Species

Details

in Australia
(Ranked 1-5, low-exc.)

Biopolitical

No negative

conditions

impact locally
Community support

4-5

exists
GOs/NGOs*

4-5

involved/supportive
Conformity with and

4-5

protection available
by laws
Environmental

Removal of cause

conditions

of decline
Habitat availability

2-4
1-5

(protected)
Habitat unsaturated

1-4

Research and Management, eds. J.M. Marzluff and R. Sallabanks, (Island Press,
Washington, 1998), pp. 125-140.
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Resource

Reintroduction

conditions

technology known
and available
Knowledge of species

1-4

(biology, ecology,
behaviour, vet. science)
Sufficient financial

0-3

resources
Condition

Wild population needs

of species

supplementation to
remain viable
New stock available
No jeopardy to wild
populations

Source: adapted from Black, ‘Threatened Waterfowl’, pp. 125-140.
Abbreviations GOs/NG0s refer to government/non-government organisations.
The latter include non-profit, volunteer and charitable organisations that are
autonomous in structure and funding but are licensed/approved and abide by
standards by governments.

Biopolitics
To address all four criteria of assessment briefly, my first point
concerns the biopolitical and the recent criticisms of an ethics of care.
Community support for the saving and maintaining of native
wildlife in Australia is currently widespread. Government
organisations and non-government voluntary organisations have
mushroomed throughout Australia. In these contexts, many
endeavours in wildlife care have evolved as single species efforts
and the focus is on the saving of individuals. Much of this
involvement is at first an involvement of the heart, a commitment
grown from compassion. Albrecht’s paper implied that human
compassion as a mere emotion is unfocussed and ultimately useless.
He states that such emotion, by implication, is spurious in
achievement, narrow in concept, ethical only in appearance rather
than content, and finally ecologically ‘unjust’. The argument made is
that an individual is saved at the expense of broader contexts and
5

that money is diverted into ‘warm and fuzzy’ feelings for
samaritarian works while the context (the environment) is left
without proper resourcing and overall planning is neglected.
Emotion is pitted against rationality and planning.
The contrast pair of emotion and rationality is a very old d

Environmental conditions
Here is my second point: Albrecht seems to argue that there is only
one way to establish long-lasting results and that is by planning for
an overall 'system'. We must distinguish here between ecosystem as
a description of the world's environment in toto and as a term that
describes very specific environments - a rain forest, wetlands, open
woodlands, etc. I am using the term in the latter meaning because
this is how arguments on targetted saving of environments have
been used. The systems approach can have substantial merit. Indeed,
we need to work for the maintenance and for the creation of habitats
in which biodiversity can exist - if indeed we still understand what a
healthy, functioning and self-sustaining ecosystem is. 5 However,
systems approaches cannot be the only approach. Norton argued
some years ago that reliance on scientific information is important
for most decisions we make, including those concerned with whole
ecosystems. However, he argues, we know so little about whole
ecosystems that whole ecosystem decisions are under-supplied by
scientific information itself. 6 The Birdlife International Biodiversity
Project identified 221 endemic bird areas covering 5 per cent of the
earth's land surface on which 75 per cent of the world's 300 and more
threatened species occur. Hence, the emphasis on concentrating on
specific endemic areas and thereby saving the largest possible
number of endangered species 7. Bibly rightly replied, however, that
the ecosystem approach is not very useful for threatened species
outside of such specific ecosystems or indeed for species with small
R.Costanza, B.G. Norton et al., eds., Ecosystem Health. New Goals for
Environmental Management, (Island Press, Washington, D.C., 1992).
6 B.G. Norton, ‘A New Paradigm for Environmental Management’, in Costanza et
al, Ecosystem Health.
7 V.H. Heywood, Global Biodiversity Assessment, (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995).
5
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numbers. 8 One might add that some species frequent several distinct
zones and would not necessarily be saved if only just one targetted
ecosystem was protected.
Habitat conditions are of crucial importance in Australia where
white stewardship of the land over the last two hundred years has
led to some of the most catastrophic records. Australia holds the top
position on the rate of extinction of native species in the world. It has
the world's worst extinction rate for mammals—seventeen species or
ten percent in 200 years representing five times the global average,
97 plant species and 2000 more are threatened, again about ten
percent. 9 Particularly the mammals of inland Australia have
suffered. 10 Over one thousand native species, as many as a third of
all Australian mammals, are in danger of extinction. For instance, it
was reported in 1995 that of the eighteen nationally recognised
species and subspecies of bandicoot, thirteen are extinct,
endangered, vulnerable or threatened. 11 Australia also now has the
most endangered amphibians and reptiles in the world. 12 Recher
pointed out some years ago that, in the past, avifauna has often not
even featured in these tallies. We are only now beginning to gain a
clearer picture of the 'abundance' and losses of some species. 13
One third of Australian forest and woodland are gone forever and
three quarters of Australia's rain forest has entirely disappeared. 14 It
is still disappearing at an alarming rate. Australia has about 550
national parks covering three per cent of the land area. 15 For the
remaining 97 per cent Australia has kept cutting vegetation at almost
C.J. Bibly, ‘A global view of priorities for bird conservation: A summary’, Ibis,
137, (1995), S247-S248.
9 G. Dunkley, The Greening of the Red. Sustainability, Socialism and the Environmental
Crisis, (Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1992).
10 S.R. Morton, ‘European Settlement and the Mammals of Arid Australia’,
Australian Environmental History, ed., S.Dovers, (Oxford University Press,
Melbourne, 1994).
11 J. Woodford, ‘Endangered bandicoot gets second chance at life in a cat-free
zone’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5, (1995).
12 N. Bita, ‘Environment worth $663bn to our future’, The Australian, 3, (1996).
13 H.F. Recher, (website), ‘Ground-dwelling and ground-foraging birds: the next
round of extinctions?’, Armidale, NSW, University of New England.n.d.
http://www.environment.gov.au/life/general-info/biolinks/biolink4.html.
14 Dunkley, The Greening of the Red.
15 Bita, ‘Environment worth $663bn to our future’.
8
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the same rate as in the Amazon 16, specifically rainforest in New
South Wales and tropical rainforests in Queensland and the
Northern Territory and so-called ‘marginal’ open woodlands, about
400,000 to 600,000 hectares per annum. Ten percent of all cropland
and as much as a quarter of pasture have been destroyed beyond
repair and over half of Australia's farmland is salinated or degraded
(80 per cent in NSW) and in need of restoration. 17
This overall tally of losses aside, removal of the source of decline of
some endangered species can be quite simple—at least in theory. It is
well-established that introduced feral species (plants and animals)
have created havoc for native flora and fauna. They have created
competition and predator-relationships for which the Australian
native species are simply not prepared. It is indeed useless to
reintroduce koalas into an area that is infested with feral dogs, foxes
and cats. The survival chances of the koala would be nearly zero in
such an environment. However, there are individuals like John
Wamsley who has started investing his money and time into earth
sanctuaries. He has become Australia’s most successful breeder of
endangered species. And the secret to his success is simple. He
constructed special fences that formed a reliable barrier for potential
predators and then removed all foxes, cats and dogs from the newly
created sanctuaries. The natural recovery rate within these precincts
was enormous. 18
There is no doubt, that action needs to be taken at all levels and
needs to occur simultaneously. To give an example, there is little
point in restocking an endangered avian population via captive
breeding programs if the cause of the decline is not at least partially
removed first. When the cause of the decline is known to be
associated with a shortage of suitable tree hollows for nesting, for
example, one would need to provide alternative nesting sites (such
as boxes) first. At the same time, one would need to implement plans
to either protect trees that will provide suitable nesting sites (and
food) or plant tree species that will eventually provide suitable
16 T. Caswell, The Green Agenda for 1994,, (Australian Conservation Foundation,
Fitzroy,Victoria, 1994).
17 Dunkley, The Greening of the Red.
18 J. Woodford, ‘The ravaged country: our shame’, The Sydney Morning Herald,
(1996), p. 25 & p. 28.
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nesting sites. For propagation of a species, such as the red-tailed
black cockatoo, natural recovery rate would be partially dependent
on the availability of large tree-hollows which in turn will develop
naturally only in trees older than 100 years, hence long-term
planning is involved here. Short-term activities can prove to be
valuable measures as a stop-gap, until some essential natural
conditions can be restored.

Resource conditions and individual rehabilitation
It is possible to repair some damage to wildlife relatively easily.
Other forms of recovery, however, may require substantial funding,
and all of the approaches require knowledge of the species and its
context. Australia's past approach to gaining and maintaining
knowledge of its own native fauna has been marred by colonial
status and derogatory European attitudes. We are now beginning to
overcome these attitudes but by no means, as yet, has the shortfall of
knowledge been redressed. This is especially true for our avifauna.
At formal governmental level, resources and the cost efficieny model
offer another vista. In the last year or so, it has been said that there
are economic decisions to be made in connection with protecting the
flora and fauna of Australia. The argument runs roughly like this:
we have only a small pot of money and, given these limitations, we
need to think carefully on how we distribute the funds and where
we place our financial efforts in order to maximise outcomes. The
answer is invariably that saving of single species is not as effective in
the long run as is saving of whole ecosystems. In other words, we
should not concentrate our resources on saving a stork but on saving
the wetlands in which storks and a myriad of other species can
continue to exist. The latter is part of a very long-standing and wellestablished debate world-wide. It is also important not to target
merely those species that are currently on the vulnerable or
endangered lists but, again, whole ecosystems that might have
supported these endangered species before. This point of view can
be questioned in several ways, as follows.

Individual rehabilitation and cost
9

With respect to individual rehabilitation the above argument has
several flaws. First, the overall argument on cost efficiency cannot be
applied easily to rehabilitation of individual animals. Arguments
favouring cost-effective planning for specific ecosystems often imply
that wildlife rehabilitation costs a lot of money that would better be
rechanneled into ecosystem preservation. The problem is that this
attitude implies that there is a pot of gold spent on wildlife
rehabilitation in this country.
This implied message of cost to government and to the broader
public is bordering on gross misinformation. Not all but most
endeavours of wildlife rehabilitation in Australia are undertaken by
volunteers, some of them on an individual basis and most others
now within rehabilitation and rescue organisations that may be
under the auspices of government departments (such as National
Parks and Wildlife). Typically, they receive no funds, equipment or
any other assistance from government sources (state or federal).
Some of the wildlife rehabilitation and rescue organisations are now
rather large and well organised, particularly in New South Wales
and Victoria.
Economically, the argument that rehabilitation of individual wildlife
is a waste of time is particularly misleading and certainly false by
any economic measure. First, it is important to stress that much of
the work and cost is borne by people who do not get paid for the
work they do. They are certainly not a burden on government funds
or taxes. Funds are raised in the community and channelled directly
back into care for wildlife (as for expensive medical treatment or
equipment). Wildlife organisations are self-funding and usually have
the status of charitable organisations. They do some fund-raising
through the year, often by selling products with a wildlife message
and very occasionally by donations. The rest of the income is derived
from membership fees. Running costs, at least in Wildlife
Information and Rescue Services (WIRES), one organisation that I
know very well, are kept to an absolute minimum and are largely
confined to such things as stationery, telephone costs and postage at
the local branch level. At branch level, all members of the
organisation are unpaid.
10

All members provide for the animals out of their own pockets. This
may involve aviaries for birds, pens for kangaroos, gunyahs for
koalas and a whole host of ‘hospital’ accommodation, including
sheets, blankets, electric blankets, heating, boxes, pouches,
terrariums for reptiles and so forth. Then there is medication to be
paid for, appropriate food to be provided, petrol costs for rescuing,
collecting and releasing an animal—again, these are items that are
paid for out of the pockets of the volunteers. During late spring and
summer, we may each travel as much as 200km per week solely for
wildlife rehabilitation work. This is of course more of an issue in
rural areas than in city environments, but petrol costs alone may be
considerable. The cost for the volunteer, apart from a membership
fee, may range from $50 a year to anything in the hundreds or even
thousands.
Funds spent on individual wildlife rescue and rehabilitation add up
when counting all individuals involved. WIRES in New South Wales,
for instance has currently about 1,500 members. If each member
spends only $100 per annum (including membership fees), the
annual expenditure for animals exceeds $150,000 by one organisation
alone, a sizeable outlay of costs to help our wildlife. Even if all costs
outlayed privately by wildlife carers were added together, the cost of
rehabilitation of wild-born species is considerably cheaper than any
zoo captive breeding program could ever be. Indeed, species
maintenance costs in captive breeding programs have been
calculated as being about 300 per cent higher than conservation costs
in the wild 19 and this is a measure of public expenditure. The true
conservation cost is even lower in Australia because of the large
commitment of voluntary wildlife care groups.
These costs are not costs that anyone can debate and include in any
theoretical or financial discussion as if they were public funds. The
cost being met by the individual carers comes from their private
pocket. There are species re-introductions masterminded by funded
and paid labour as well but, so far, these are minute efforts
compared to individual rehabilitation of wildlife by volunteers, even
though they attract a good deal more media attention.

A.P. Dobson, Conservation and Biodiversity, (Scientific American Library, New
York, 1996).
19
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Human intervention in the natural world and
rehabilitation
My third argument concerns the implied criticism of human
intervention in animal survival. This set of arguments is, of
necessity, pragmatic, anecdotal and informed merely by my own
longstanding practice of rehabilitation of Australian wildlife and by
considerable time spent writing about and observing wildlife
rehabilitation outside Australia.
In my own practice of caring for birds, about 65-78 per cent of birds
brought into care get released. Of the 22 percent who do not make it
to release stage, about 5 percent have died whilst in care while 17 per
cent have to be euthanased. My own figures compare well with
Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics from the USA made available in the
last few years. Between 1995-1997 they show that at least half of the
admitted animals were released, while additional others, which
presumably have also been successfully released, were transported
to more suitable care sites. 20

Rehabilitation of wildborn injured adult animals
Causes of death vary from overload of parasites to severe traumatic
events, the latter being the predominant cause of misadventure. The
nature of the injuries or damages that ground the birds in the first
place are of some importance here. The most important of these are
traumatic events. They can be subdivided into several categories:
1.
2.
3.
4.

human induced and human caused
feral/domestic animal induced and caused
natural events
disease

In my own experience, the most common cause of coming into care
are traumatic events caused by humans (presented in category 1).
This tallies well with the results of a detailed study of birds of prey
in another part of the world. They studied the causes of admission to
Website, ‘Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics’, (1998).
http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/instruct/devold/twrid/html/stats.htm.
20

12

the zoo animal and exotic pet clinic of the veterinary faculty in
Zurich between 1 January 1985 and 31 December 1994. Forty-seven
per cent of all admissions in that period were trauma and half of
them suffered from fractures, caused usually by car accidents. 21
Human induced and human caused traumatic events can be
subdivided into malicious and intentional, preventable and
accidental. Fortunately, today, most harm inflicted by humans on
wildlife is no longer malicious or intentional. But there are still
examples of this. Recently I received an Australian Hobby
(Australia's smallest falcon) whose legs were both cleanly snapped
off high at the thigh. The type of cut suggested the use of a now
illegal rabbit trap. Some farmers (very few now) still falsely believe
that birds of prey are enemies of their lifestock and a few have been
suspected of placing baited rabbit traps on fences. The birds caught
in these traps die a most cruel death of starvation which may take up
to a fortnight. Needless to add that the Hobby was euthanased.
Shooting of wedgetailed eagles also does occur still in some parts of
Australia and this too is based on ignorance or misinformation, and
sometimes on callousness.
Many birds and indeed other Australian native wildlife suffer or die
from human induced acts which are preventable. The largest
category of injuries I receive come from road accidents, including
broken limbs and bones, concussions, lacerations—indeed the whole
range of injuries that humans may also sustain when hit by a car. In
addition, injured animals suffer from shock and dehydration.
Occasionally, birds are brought in that have been caught in barbed
wire fences or have flown against a window at high speed.
Preventable categories of injuries to birds concern also the poor habit
of poisoning either to catch introduced pests and predators such as
foxes or rodents. Unfortunately, baits are not marked ‘foxes only
21 J.M. Hatt, R. Baumgartner, et al., ‘Diagnosis and therapy of raptors with a
compilation of cases 1985-1994’, Schweizer Archiv fuer Tierheilkunde 138/9, (1996),
pp. 434-440.
Latest data from WIRES show that approximately 11 percent of animals in WIRES
care (all animal groups) are a result of motor vehicle accidents. (The rate of
accident survivors and deaths may be considerably higher for some avian species,
see later).

13

please’ and birds on the upper end of the food-chain may die as a
consequence of poisoned bait. Another preventable cause of death
concerns the group of herbicides and insecticides that are sometimes
sprayed excessively. Tawny frogmouths, for instance, are extremely
susceptible to poisoning by insecticides. I have used humidicribs and
oxygen support to treat poisoned Tawny frogmouths with
symptoms similar to dyptheria and accompanied by general
paralysis.
These damages described above are human induced and show the
conflictual side of the encounter between human civilisation
activities and the natural world in the most dramatic and visible
form. The question is, what conclusions we draw from this
information?
The argument that opponents to wildlife rehabilitation either imply
or even state is that interference in the natural order of things is a
bad thing. They argue that there is a high attrition rate of young
offspring in many species that is natural. That is certainly true, both
of avian and mammalian species. For instance, in drought years,
ringtail or brushtail possums and red or eastern grey kangaroo
offspring may have a mortality rate above 65 per cent or even higher
in their first months or year of life. 22 There is also a ‘natural’ selection
by disease and levels of skill that each individual member of the
species needs to develop. Those that do not develop them to high
levels will perish. A bird of prey that is not a good hunter will die or
at least not reproduce. Generally, the argument is implied or stated
that the weak, the sick and the old will perish. Only the healthy, the
strong and/or the resourceful will survive and will therefore
maintain a healthy ‘gene-pool’ and levels of skills ensuring survival
for future generations. The argument goes on to say that wildlife
rehabilitation interferes in the natural selection of species by
supporting the weak, the sick and the old and it therefore
contributes to weakening the wildlife generally.

A.S.I. London, ‘Lactation and neonatal survival of mammals’, in Advances in
Animal Conservation, eds. J.P.Hearn and J. K. Hodges, (Clarendon Press, Oxford ,
1985), 54, pp. 183-207.

22
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The problem with this view is not that there may be a process
described by the name of 'natural selection' (where do accidents rank
in the 'natural' selection process?) but that it is assumed that the
victims of injuries belong into the category of the weak, sick, old or
unskilled. Here we have the strongest error of logic. Suffering an
accident as a consequence of contact with humans does not
necessarily denote individual weakness or unsuitability. Quite often,
the victims are the healthy ones, selected out already through the
natural processes to carry on their species. I do not wish to overstate
the case, particularly in the absence of robust statistical evidence, but
I suspect that the birds I treat may often be the healthiest, the fittest,
the mature.
The damage we cause to our environment has often been described
in terms of environmental degradation, encroachments on ever
decreasing areas of wilderness and remaining stands of secondary
forests, and in terms of pollution and human self-assertion for space.
The damage to our wildlife has also been understood as being
caused partly by the introduction of feral species. However, one set
of causes of the current demise that is so often left out even of
environmental debate concerns technology itself. In only a few
places around the globe are there any deliberate and funded
programs that will address the effect some of our modern
technology has on wildlife. Powerlines, the car, airplanes, boats,
tracking stations, wire, barbed wire and electric fences are structures
that kill animals in their hundreds and thousands. One newspaper
pointed out recently that the road toll in New South Wales alone
claims 7000 victims of native animals daily. 23 How many are there
really, if one includes all other areas of technology and how many
thousands more would we count per day if we add pollutants in
water, soil and air? And how many tens of thousands would we
A recent study of road kills in New South Wales by WIRES in conjunction with
Professor Cooper of Macquarie University, also showed that the majority of
animals killed on roads consist largely of native animals (80 different species in a
sample size of 381). The species which are most affected are the grey kangaroo, the
swamp wallaby, brushtailed and ringtail possums, wombats, bearded dragons,
blue tongue lizards and two species of birds: the magpie and the galah (all these
species occurred more than ten times in the sample of 381 road kills), cit.
‘LifeWires’, Summer, 99, in D.W. Cooper, ‘Road Kills of Animals on some New
South Wales Roads—Final Report on Data Collected by WIRES Volunteers in
1997’, WIRES Head Office, PO Box 260 Forestville NSW 2087, p. 16’.
23
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need to add to the already known carnage if we counted hunting,
habitat loss and introduced exotic species?
In evolutionary time, technological structures are not environmental
features to which we can expect full adaptation by animals. It is not a
sign of their lack of skill or of maladaptive behaviour if they get
electrocuted on power-poles (in the gap between the wooden bar on
top of a pole and the wire connection). It is not a sign of visual
impairment if birds do not always detect metal wire fences. It
requires no sickness or weakness to get blinded by an oncoming car,
and it cannot be called stupidity when animals need to cross a road
to get to water or to another part of their own territory.
There are ways of fixing quite quickly and relatively cheaply at least
some of the problems associated with technological structures. For
instance, there are reflectors that can be placed on roads to warn
animals, there are wind/sound creating devices to fit on bumperbars
of cars to warn animals of oncoming traffic. Such devices could be
fitted routinely to every car. Barbed wire could be outlawed because
birds sustain horrific injuries from such fencing and usually have to
be euthanased. There is a multitude of design possibilities for a
whole host of things but the efforts are few and far between, either in
terms of marketing and actual use, or in terms of design. We need to
think more cleverly and compassionately about animals also in
terms of the things we put in the environment for human use and
convenience.
I personally believe that human intervention, i.e. thinking of making
modern technology safer for wildlife as well as wildlife
rehabilitation itself, is vital as damage is so often caused by human
intervention in the first place. My work, as I see it, is merely a very
small attempt to correct for the ravages of human actions. This, I
think, holds true both for injuries caused through human technology
and structures, as well as for damage incurred by feral animals.
The solutions concerning feral animals and the disappearance of
suitable habitat are more complex problems to solve and have to
involve several agencies or at least several processes simultaneously.
The point here is that in a number of demonstrable cases,
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intervention at the level of wildlife treatment and care is not
sufficient by itself to make a difference in all cases. I would not
therefore conclude that we should stop treating injured koalas but I
would propose that programs for the control or elimination of feral
animals are a case in point where public funds might be usefully
spent.

Rehabilitation and success rate
Finally, the opponents of wildlife rehabilitation argue that this
activity is a waste of time because only a minute proportion (figures
of 1 to ten per cent of successful releases are usually cited) of wildlife
coming into care are supposedly surviving in the wild thereafter. I
challenge anyone to say that we can trust any of these pessimistic
figures at all and use them in debate about the value of wildlife
rehabilitation. First, there are very few studies so far undertaken that
systematically follow animals post rehabilitation, and the few studies
are concentrated on even fewer species. Yet these figures are at times
presented as if they concerned ALL rehabilitation efforts of ALL
species anywhere in Australia. This is blatantly incorrect.
We have few trustworthy examples of proven rehabilitation success
and one of the reasons why we have so few is that it is often difficult
to follow animals post-release. Tracking by transmitter devices is
expensive and requires funding. Moreover, tracking devices are not
always very good for the animal. Many of the wildlife rehabilitators
specialising in birds have ensured that their birds get banded before
release, so that their fate can be recorded should they fall into human
hands again. In the years that raptors in my care were banded (by a
licensed birdbander) only one bird has ever come to my attention
again.
The question is also how one measures rehabilitation success or
survival success? What are the markers for such success? How long
need an animal have spent in rehabilitation before being considered
part of a rehabilitation statistic and how long need it have survived
in the wild post-release to become a success or a failure in the
statistics?
17

For instance, a sparrow-hawk suffered a concussion by flying into a
window of a house nestling in Australian bush. The bird spent one
week in care and was then released in the same spot where it was
found. From my hand it flew vertically high into the sky and soared
there for half an hour until it was lost from sight. Is the one week
care counted as a rehabilitation case? On what grounds would
anyone want to argue that this release was unsuccessful or its
survival chances slim as a consequence of rehabilitation or some
prior disposition? The bird was in splendid health. It would seem
difficult in those cases to make the point of failure of rehabilitation
or of waste of time.
Another example: a barn owl (banded) was killed by a car at night
on a lonely rural road three months after release. The bird was an
adult when it came into care and remained in care for two weeks.
Would anyone count the death of this bird three months post-release
as a failure of rehabilitation or not? I would say that it was not a
failure. This nocturnal bird might have attended to a roadkill and
was then in turn surprised and blinded by a car, suffering the same
fate. The fact that the bird came into care in the first place for an
injury likely to have been sustained by another car accident is at least
noteworthy. I would not speak of predisposition but there is a point
to argue that the bird occupied a poor territory through which a
gravel road wound in several places. These two examples are not
exceptional cases. Rather, they may well be typical.
The majority of animals requiring care usually remain in care for a
period of three days to three weeks. Are these all excluded from
measures by those willing to seriously propose that only 1-10 per
cent of wildlife rehabilitation is successful? And even if, for
argument's sake, my own tally of 65-78 animals successfully released
per hundred is challenged as being inflated. I might reply: what if
one were to be ultra pessimistic and ventured to think that in fact
per annum only 20 of the rehabilitated birds continued to live to old
age? This may seem a small number. However, there is strength in
numbers here. If everyone of the 1,500 members of the wildlife
organisation just saved 20 animals per year (and this is an ultraconservative estimate) this would bring the annual net gain to a
respectable tally of 30,000 saved animals.
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This is not to say that other methods, as proposed above (animal
friendly counter-technology), could not ultimately achieve more. But
we do not have it at the moment. I am convinced that there would
not be one person working in rehabilitation or even in captive
propagation and reintroduction programs who would not welcome
such technological change. But such tasks have to be left to other
groups and organisations with other focal points of activity.

Rehabilitation and release of wildborn orphaned
animals
In another category there are animals coming into care which not
only require longer care before release but also have to be trained by
a human foster carer. These are animals that arrive as infants,
nestlings or juveniles and would die if not cared for. Handraising
Australian wildlife is now done quite successfully by a large army of
people from very different walks of life. Here is not the place to cite
the hundreds of examples of successful reunions with parents or
flocks or the returns of handraised birds a year after release, or to
marvel at the observable and repeated return of handraised birds to
my backyard with new partners in tow. All of these stories, while
heartwarming, could be dismissed as anecdotal and as statistically
insignificant successes.
In the case of raising and then releasing animals, there may indeed
be a host of problems which affect the survival chances of the
handraised individual. These problems ought not to be down-played
and it is in this group that some of the negative press may most
likely arise. Depending on the species, it is mostly not just a matter
of feeding and caring but often of training the animal into all the
right behaviours that are essential for that individual’s survival. This
is often easier said than done. It is relatively easy to teach food
recognition, provided that the carer has sufficient knowledge of the
foods that a species eats. Usually, however, foster care offers only a
limited variety of the foods that are available in the natural
environment and here lies one substantial problem. The few foods
that the animal has learnt to identify may not be the foods that are
available all year round or plentiful all the time and the animal could
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therefore starve to death. It can also be relatively difficult to teach
the skills necessary for finding the right food. For instance, I have
handraised many magpies and I know that they survived for at least
5 months post-release because they stayed in the area. But how does
a human teach a magpie that it needs to listen to the sound of a
scarab larvae underground and then pierce the beak into exactly the
spot of the sound? We usually find ways around it, such as hiding
worms under leaf litter, or, if one is lucky enough, find an older
animal of the same species to act as tutor. It is difficult to teach
predator recognition and social behaviour towards conspecifics. One
magpie I had to raise without conspecifics was rather skilled in
finding food but hopeless in social interaction with other magpies
and therefore not exactly acceptable in magpie society. Release can
also pose problems, as to time of year, territory and even time of
day.
The host of problems associated with handraising wildborn animals
that are then being released is also strongly associated with our lack
of knowledge of native species. Here I concur entirely with Glenn
Albrecht. Knowledge of our wildlife is just in its infancy and patchy
at best. We need to improve this situation urgently. While this is
widely recognised, the implementation into education programs has
been relatively slow and difficult. There are many native species
about which one cannot find anything written beyond the purely
descriptive. Behaviour, ecology, diseases are often poorly
understood. There are still many species of mammals and especially
of birds on whom we have the most rudimentary knowledgeinsufficient to deal effectively, i.e. from a knowledge base, with the
species. To give an example here: on the much adored kookaburra,
there exists only one book and a hand-full of articles that have ever
been published and most on ecology, not on behaviour. On the
magpie, another icon of Australian culture, I have found 35 scientific
articles written in the last 100 years - and only a handful are on
behaviour. Our knowledge of behaviour for most other native bird
species is woefully lacking and in this context, much of the work is
being carried out in a ‘hit-and miss’ style. We have all learned by
trial and error—and even if we feel successful cannot say whether
our preparation was sufficient to carry the individual to adulthood
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and mating success. Within such context it is not difficult to see how
rehabilitation, translocation and captive breeding programs may fail.
On the other hand, we have probably the highest incidence of
grassroots knowledge of local species of any western nation.
Countless voluntary organisations consisting of individuals who
have often devoted their lives to the welfare of native species, have
also amassed vast amounts of experience and knowledge. Sadly, the
practitioners are often not the writers and valuable knowledge is
constantly being lost and replenished in endless cycles of
rehabilitation practice. By contrast, tertiary offers of programs in
animal behaviour of Australian native species are still in their
infancy, and this is often so because there is no teaching material
available. There is thus not just an urgent need for more knowledge
of native species, especially avian, but it seems well overdue that
there needs to be a systematic endeavour to break out of the many
‘catch 22’ situations that surround the gaining and dissemination of
knowledge concerning Australian wildlife.
Captive breeding programs have some similar issues attached to
wildborn orphaned rehabilitation programs but unlike the
rehabilitation programs run by volunteer organisations which accept
any native animal in need of attention—whether abundant or rare—
captive breedings programs are usually reserved for endangered
species. These captive breeding programs are indeed largely and
almost exclusively undertaken by institutions, such as zoos, with
special breeding licenses. They are cost and labour intensive.
At the same time, all studies have shown that any relocation,
reintroduction or other schemes are more successful with wildborn
species than with species born and bred in captivity. 24 The questions
that the failures raise are surely fruitful questions—as long as we
remain willing to be flexible.
Perhaps they also show us that we need to be vigilant even with our
abundant species. Wildlife rehabiliation of wildborn species is still
Griffith et al. ‘Translocation as a species conservation tool’, pp. 477-480 and T.J.
Cade & S. A. Temple, ‘Management of threatened bird species: Evaluation of the
hands-on approach’, Ibis, 137, (1995), S161-S172.
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the cheapest and most effective method to date. It would be a
mistake, in my view, if all efforts went into the end of the decline
phase of a species. Keep them abundant and many of the
enormously time and cost consuming efforts of saving species from
the brink of extinction would not be necessary. For this it is
necessary to refocus attention to all species, not just the endangered
ones.

Conclusion
The US National Committee for Biology has a program underway
called ‘DIVERSITAS’. This is an international program and involves
scholars around the world. It is a program that attempts to integrate
conceptually (and functionally) all aspects of protecting and
increasing biological diversity in the world.
They understand that humans play critical roles in this. These roles
are themselves diverse. What the biologist would like to do is to
build into the DIVERSITAS program a set of specific roles for
humans. The questions that they ask are ‘What are the possible
roles?’, ‘How might these roles be fostered’, ‘By whom?’. And we
might also ask, ‘For whose benefit?’. There is a need to pull together,
to form teams of researchers, field practitioners and specialists in
many diverse areas. P.J.S. Olney and colleagues argued in 1994 that
we need to show creativity in conservation. Creativity here also
involves the willing partnership and interface between education,
public relations, fund raising, behaviour, genetics, captive breeding
and care, ecology, population dynamics and conservation politics. 25
This is happening now, at least in some corners of Australia and for
some species. There is little gained in one group ‘knocking’ another,
or one activity receiving disparaging comments only to defend its
own.
There are many shortcomings indeed in our present state of
knowledge and in the overall management of the Australian native
P.J.S. Olney, G. M. Mace, et al., eds., Creative Conservation: The Interface between
captive and wild populations, (Chapman & Hall, London, 1994) and Black,
‘Threatened Waterfowl’, pp. 125-140.
25
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wildlife. My reply would be: there are many steps that need to be
taken in order to walk a mile. Compassion for animals is surely the
first step in any endeavour. Another step is rehabilitation, another is
protecting habitat, yet another is to create laws and policies designed
to apportion some rights to the natural world and to animals, and
not just to the human species and yet further important steps
concern the creation of an educational environment which fosters the
knowledge and dissemination of knowledge of our wildlife. Why
condemn anything that is a step in the right direction? We all know
that it cannot be the only step.
The ultimate aim must surely be that we do not just want animals to
survive but to have a quality of life commensurate with their
needs—physical, psychological, social and cultural. The
rehabilitation programs that have been referred to here are an
exercise not just in compassion but in the practice of biodiversity.
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Whither rights? Animal rights and the rise
of new welfarism
Nicola Taylor

T

he notion of an animal rights movement is one which has the
potential to mislead since those fighting for animals come
from a variety of different ideological backgrounds and
advocate many different ways to achieve many different
aims. Gary Francione 1 argues that animal rights have become
subsumed in what he terms ‘new welfarism’. New welfarism is a
hybrid approach which advocates more ‘traditional’ welfarist aims
in the short term with the ultimate goal being one of animal rights
and animal liberation in the long term. It is a sort of ‘crisis
management’ whereby initial welfare problems are dealt with on a
daily basis but the ultimate goal of liberating animals is never
forgotten. Francione is critical of this ‘soft option’ and argues that to
ever achieve anything the animal rights movement needs a return to
its roots, ie. (direct) action towards the ultimate goal of total animal
liberation and nothing else. This article takes issue with these
sentiments and, based on three years of fieldwork within the animal
rights community, argues that it may be the case that some of the
larger animal rights charities have adopted this approach, but that
the movement at the local activist level remains united in believing
that direct action is the only method desirable or indeed effective in
achieving its goal, which is one of complete animal liberation.
The generic term ‘animal protectionism’ is perhaps a more apt and a
more relevant one to explain the vast numbers of people concerned
with issues of animal abuse, cruelty and rights today since these
people often come from diverse ideological backgrounds. One way
to categorize these different backgrounds (should we wish to do so)
is to argue that there are those involved in animal welfare and that
G. Francione, Animals, Property and the Law, (Temple University Press,
Philadelphia, 1995).
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there are those involved in animal rights and that the two are fairly
self-contained and are fairly distinct. The only problem with this is
that there seems to be a third ‘movement’ growing out of a merger
of these two, hitherto fairly discrete, positions. This hybrid position
is what Gary Francione terms ‘new welfarism’. 2
Animal welfare has always, somewhat mistakenly, been
characterized as a group of elderly, overly emotional women who
are eccentrically too concerned with their pet cats. Sexist
connotations aside, this stereotype is fundamentally misplaced. The
animal welfare movement came into being on a large and mobilized
scale for the first time during the nineteenth century in Britain. This
movement was born out of the wider humanitarian movement
popular at the time and yet, in many ways, became stronger and
more enduring than its predecessors. The animal welfare movement
of the nineteenth century was almost exclusively concerned with the
issue of vivisection, although there were a small number of
exceptions to this. Vivisection raised its head as an issue of public
debate from about the mid-nineteenth century and stemmed from
the fact that many scientists were only too happy to conduct live
experiments on animals in public places as a way of displaying their
newly gained knowledge and techniques. This in turn led to the
institutionalization of the so-called ‘scientific method,’ ie. the idea
that the most productive and efficient way to gain biological
knowledge was from experiments conducted on live animals. It was
this institutionalization that the nineteenth century antivivisectionists were fighting against.
A number of commentators 3 have argued that this anti-vivisection
campaign was based on a deeper anti-science sentiment, and
certainly the main players in the anti-vivisection crusade didn’t hide
the fact that they were highly sceptical of science in general and of
medicine in particular. Much of this came from the fact that many of
those prominent in this movement were women who felt that
ibid.
R.D. French, Anti-Vivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society, (Princeton
University Press, 1975); H. Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures
in the Victorian Age, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987) and J. Turner,
Reckoning With the Beast: Animals, Pain and Humanity in the Victorian Mind, (Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980).

2
3

28

medical science (and the growth of gynaecology at this time) was
taking huge liberties with both women’s and animals’ bodies.
Despite the fact that this anti-vivisection movement was one largely
comprised of and led by women the sexist stereotype referred to
above is a poor misconception of a movement and an issue which
had the strength to ‘divide a nation’. 4 The anti-vivisection movement
of the Victorian era is one which had many public and powerful
advocates.
I give this brief foray into the history of animal welfare for three
reasons. The first is to contest a misconceived stereotype; the second
is because until the 1970s this was the most important, powerful,
successful and popular movement pertaining to animals and their
treatment and the third is because many see a logical progression
from this early humane movement to the animal protection
movements we have today.
The impetus of the nineteenth century anti-vivisection movement
largely died with the beginning of the first world war and, although
there were still a number of animal welfare charities running and a
few new ones coming into being, none had the powerful hold over
the public of this early anti-vivisection movement. There was a
resurgence of interest in animal issues from the late 1960s and early
1970s but this was a different kind of interest involving a different
kind of supporter.
The tone of these new animal protection movements was radically
different to that of the early humane movement. Instead of
advocating the welfare of animals under our care and for our use,
this movement argued that it was not morally right for us to
consider animals our inferiors and therefore it was not morally right
for us to make use of them. This later movement came to be known
as the animal rights movement because it was predicated on a belief
in the natural rights of animals. With this change in ideology came a
change in tactics. Compared to the animal welfare movement’s
campaigning methods the methods of this new breed of animal

4
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rights activist were far more radical. The majority of animal rights
campaigners believed in the need for direct action. The notion of
direct action is a tricky one and, due to the inevitable exclusivity of
media attention on the illegal forms of direct action, is often one
which conjures up its own stereotype of a masked raider sending
car-bombs to known vivisectors and spraying paint over fur-coats.
This is a huge misconception. The majority of direct action
undertaken by animal rights activists is legal, taking the form of
protests, marches and leaflet campaigns.
Garner 5 argues that the issue of direct action is one which must be
treated carefully since ‘the association between these extreme
methods and the radicalism of animal rights and liberation views
has resulted in a simplistic dichotomy between, on the one hand,
traditional animal welfare and constitutionalism and, on the other
hand, the equation of animal rights/liberation with violence and
illegality’. Not only is this a misconceived notion but most animal
rights activity is peaceful and law abiding.
When the law is broken in the name of animal rights there are three
ways in which this is done. Garner typifies these as: ‘the classic form
of non-violent civil disobedience involving sit-ins and vigils’—also
included here are break-ins into laboratories which test on animals
in order to gather information; ‘those actions which set out
deliberately to cause damage to property’ such as the wrecking of
laboratory equipment and the shooting of butcher’s windows—to
this second one I would add theft, ie. the theft involved when animal
rights activists ‘liberate’ animals from laboratories; and ‘the much
more serious actions which involve threats to human life and safety’,
such as the firebombings of department store furriers in the 1980s
and the letter bombing campaigns of the 1980s.
Although the new animal rights movement from the 1970s onwards
was one which was radically different in philosophy and action from
that of the 1870s, its collective belief in the need for direct action and
direct action alone to secure the liberation of animals is one which

R. Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality, (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1993), p. 215.
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has not been sustained by all involved with the same amount of
fervour into the 1990s.
The ‘new welfarism’ which Francione 6 identifies is not actually that
new. In 1959 two British scientists, Russell and Burch 7, advocated a
number of changes which could potentially replace the use of
animals in laboratory experiments. In the meantime, however, they
called for a number of changes which could either reduce the
numbers of animals being used or refine their use resulting in less
pain. Stephens argues that this ‘Replacement, Reduction and
Refinement constitute the three R’s of the alternative approach to
laboratory practices’. 8 He goes on to point out that ‘the ultimate goal
of this approach is the complete replacement of laboratory animals
with non-animal methods that are at least as scientifically sound
(some would say unsound) as animal based methods’. 9
The ‘new welfarism’ which Francione identifies 10 is remarkably
similar to the ‘alternative approach’ identified by Stephens. 11
Francione argues that the rights position is based on the notion that
some animals at least have rights and ‘that treating them solely as
means to human ends violates those rights’, whereas the ‘welfare
position maintains that animal interests may be ignored if the
consequences for humans justify it’. 12 He argues that the two main
problems which arise out of the welfare approach are firstly that it
propagates the myth that animal welfarism actually works, which he
believes to be false. He gives the example of a reduction in the
number of animals used in research and argues that the recording of
these numbers is highly suspect and even if this were not the case
then it would be difficult to see animal welfare measures as the sole
causal factor which accounts for the reduction in the number of
G. Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’, 48 Rutgers L. Review, 397
(1996), http://www.animal-law.org/library/araw/html.
7 W. Russell, & R. Burch, The Principles Of Humane Experimental Technique,
(Methuen, London, 1959).
8 M. Stephens, ‘Replacing Animal Experiments’, in Animal Experimentation. The
Consensus Changes, ed. G Langley, (Macmillan, London, 1989).
9 ibid., p. 144.
10 Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’.
11 Stephens, ‘Replacing Animal Experiments’ p. 144.
12 G. Francione, ‘Animal Rights: An Incremental Approach’ in Animal Rights. The
Changing Debate, ed. R. Garner, (Macmillan, London, 1996).
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animals used in research. The second problem he sees with the
welfare approach is that it implies that animal rights is not a realistic
alternative to animal welfare which he clearly believes to be false. 13
He believes that there is a way to take an incremental approach to
animal rights without resorting to a warfare position. This
incremental approach involves ‘the use of deontological norms that
prohibit rather than regulate certain conduct, that recognise that
animals have certain interests that are not subject to being
sacrificed’. 14 He further believes that ‘each incremental measure
erodes the status of animals as property’ 15 which is necessary if
animal rights are ever going to be taken seriously and if animals are
ever going to be afforded some protection by the law. 16
Francione sincerely believes that the ‘new welfare’ position is a poor
alternative to the rights position and, furthermore, he argues that a
number of animal rights concerns have ‘sold out’ to this position. He
explains:
It appears as though the new welfarists believe
that some causal connection exists between
cleaner cages today and empty cages
tomorrow…. As a result the animal ‘rights’
movement, despite its rhetorical use of rights
language and its long term goal of abolishing
institutionalized animal exploitation, continues
to pursue an ideological and practical agenda
that is functionally indistinguishable from
measures endorsed by those who accept the
legitimacy of at least some forms of
exploitation. 17

ibid., pp. 55-58.
ibid., p. 53.
15 ibid. p. 57.
16 For a further discussion on the status of animals as property see G. Francione,
‘Animals as Property’, Animal Law, 2 (1996), http://www.animallaw.org/library/anmlprop.htm and Francione, Animals, Property and the Law.
17 Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’, p. 2.
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It is with these sentiments that I wish to take issue. Francione may be
correct in arguing that ‘some’ of those involved in the animal rights
movement have adopted this hybrid approach to animal protection,
but those involved in the movement at a grass roots level still take
the view that the only acceptable outcome of the struggle is
liberation of animals from human oppression which is necessarily
predicated on a belief in the rights of non-human animals. The two
are inextricably linked in that action taken to liberate animals is
based on the ideology of their rights.
As Garner notes:
The growth of mass activism is clearly linked to
the belief, derived from an animal rights
perspective, that since so much more is wrong
with our treatment of animals than was
previously thought, only permanent and
sustained activism will help put things right.
Likewise it is no accident that the use of sometimes violent - direct action has
corresponded with the development of a rights
position. 18
The field work on which this article is based spans three years and
involved my regular participation in both animal welfare and animal
rights networks. The animal welfare data was gained from working
in two animal shelters over a period of 3 years and then following
this up with interviews with the staff at the two shelters and with the
managers of five other animal sanctuaries. I also regularly attended
the meetings of one animal shelter which were held with the general
public every month in order to inform interested parties, and
financial contributors, about what was currently taking place at the
sanctuary. The animal rights data comes from my participation in a
local grass roots animal rights group over a period of three years
and from a number of interviews conducted with the animal rights
18 R. Garner, ‘The Road to Shoreham: Ideological and Political Aspects in the
Evolution of the British Animal Rights Movement’, unpublished paper given to
Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester Metropolitan
University, March 1995, p. 12.
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activists belonging to this group. I also subscribed to two larger
animal rights groups, Animal Aid and British Union for the
Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), in order to receive their newsletters
and information regarding their campaigns.
A small number of those involved in the animal shelters (ie. animal
welfare) advocated an animal rights position and saw no
contradiction in the fact that they were working in an environment
which condoned, if not supported, the use of animals as pets. The
rationale behind this was that they were working to better the
welfare of specific animals and whilst, in an ideal world, they may
not condone animals as pets, the current situation demanded that
they do something about it. As one interviewee explained:
Its our fault in the first place, I mean we
domesticated them and now we can’t even take
care of them. It should be our duty to do that at
least seeing as though we did this to them in
the first place. In an ideal world, no, there’d be
no pets, but right now there are and about 300
of them are being destroyed on a weekly basis
because we aren’t dealing with what we’ve
done so, no, there’s no contradiction between
what I’m doing now and my animal rights
beliefs. I’m still fighting for animals’ rights just
in a different way. At least here I can be sure
that this dog or this cat which can’t survive on
its own gets to live out the rest of its life in
plush surroundings. It’s the least we can do.
The majority of those involved in animal welfare were not involved
in animal rights and didn’t particularly feel the need to address these
issues. For example it has been pointed out that one of the key
elements in the adoption of an animal rights agenda is in taking a
vegan/vegetarian diet 19 and nearly all of those working in the
animal shelters were meat-eaters. The only two exceptions to this
R. Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality, (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1993) and H. Guither, Animal Rights: History and Scope of a Radical
Social Movement, (Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1998).
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were both moral vegetarians who supported animal rights
philosophy and were involved in peripheral animal rights
campaigning such as sponsored dog walks to raise money for
charities such as NAVS (National Anti-Vivisection Society).
The rest of the workers involved in animal shelters advocated a
welfare position based on the notion that it is our responsibility to
care for animals properly, although they tended to be solely
concerned with pet animals. This usually took the form of providing
information about the care of pets and becoming involved in issues
which directly affected the status of animals as pets such as antiquarantine appeals. Most of the staff at the shelters took the line that
animal rights might in theory be a good thing but for now it was
fairly unobtainable and at least they were doing something
worthwhile and productive in the meantime, actions for which they
could clearly see an end result that improved the status of a number
of animals, ie. seeing them placed in caring homes. Despite an
overall agreement that the ideals of animal rights might be
something worthwhile in the future, the majority of the sanctuary
workers saw animal rights activists in terms of the media stereotype,
ie. as violent law breakers single-mindedly intent upon the
foolhardy liberation of all animals no matter what the effect on the
environment or the population.
The people involved in the animal rights group however had
radically different views. The composition of the group was as
diverse as other studies have led us to believe. There was a small
number of students which possibly flies in the face of folklore
concerning animal rights activists. Indeed, one member of the group
explained that it is difficult to attract younger people to the group
and if they do come it is difficult to get them to come again. He put
this down to the fact that the group was often very insular and did
not particularly welcome newcomers. Being based in a city with a
number of universities, attracting student interest should have been
fairly easy and yet there were only one or two current students in
the group. Most of the group were between 25 and 35 and had been
students themselves at one time or another. There was a significant
number of activists who fell outside this age bracket with the oldest
being in her fifties. Similarly the activists came from radically
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different backgrounds. There was a schoolteacher, a university
lecturer, a number of women who worked at home with children, an
accountant and a social worker. Those routinely involved in the dayto-day activities of the group tended to be unemployed which
allowed them more time to commit to their actions on behalf of
animals.
All of the group were involved in activism in some way although
there was a central core of a smaller number (around ten to fifteen)
who were involved in nearly all the campaigns being run and who
tended to take responsibility for the organizing of the day-to-day
activities needed to run a campaign such as allocating the van to
various areas, ringing round other activists to arrange times and
venues etc. It has been well documented that the Animal Liberation
Front (ALF) in particular and the grass roots animal rights
movement in general is a non-hierarchical ‘organisation.’ 20
Although, the term ‘organisation’ itself is misleading, considering
that each local group sees itself as part of a larger movement but
there is little formal contact with the rest of the ‘movement’ and
certainly no centralized command structure. Different local groups
were in contact with each other as many of the activists attended
more than one group meeting. Similarly the different campaigns
were fertile meeting grounds for those in different groups. There
was also, on occasion, a call for all groups to attend a particular
campaign when it was felt that more pressure would be productive,
such as the call for a ‘national hit’ on a particular hunt meeting.
These would occur for a variety of reasons such as one meeting
which was infamous for its brutality to the point that the ‘sabbing’ of
this particular hunt was considered too risky for the activists. In this
case every year at the beginning of the season this hunt was made
the target of a ‘national hit’ where all groups would send as many
bodies as possible to make their presence felt. It was openly
admitted that not much would be achieved at these hits for the
animals in question. They were more a way of letting those involved
in the hunt know that they hadn’t been forgotten and that their
violence was in vain.
20 D. Henshaw, Animal Warfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation Front, (Fontana,
London, 1989) and I. Newkirk, 1992, Free the Animals! The Story of the American ALF
and its Founder, Valerie, (The Noble Press, Chicago, 1992).
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The group meetings I attended certainly adhered to this egalitarian
de-centralized principle. The chair of the group changed with each
meeting and within meetings according to who knew the most about
the topic up for discussion. Thus one person would lead the report
on the recent hunt sabs that had occurred in the region and this
would be someone who had been at all, or nearly all of them and
someone else would lead the discussion about street collections and
this would be someone who had been involved in the most recent
street collections and so on. Anyone could contribute to any of the
discussions and anyone could raise new topics for discussion, even
newcomers.
Francione, in his argument that the fight for animal rights has
adopted a ‘new welfarist’ approach, seems to be basing his argument
on the larger national and international groups involved in animal
rights campaigns such as the BUAV and People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals (PETA). He argues that even the so-called
more ‘radical’ animal rights groups have recently distanced
themselves from animal rights and quotes 21 Ingrid Newkirk, director
of PETA, as saying that the ‘all or nothing’ approach of animal rights
is ‘unrealistic’.
A further example of this line of argument comes from the President
of the Humane Society of the United States who argued that animal
rights threatens the ‘kind of respectability that HSUS and a number
of organizations have worked hard to achieve in order to distinguish
the legitimate animal protection movement from the more radical
elements’. 22 Francione makes the point that not all advocates
embrace a welfarist position and that there is a new breed of animal
advocate who accepts and fights for reform in the short term but still
sees rights as the ultimate goal: the new welfarist. Although
Francione’s examples drawn from the larger animal rights charities
seem to support this argument he does not take into account the
grass roots activist.

21
22

Francione, quoted in ‘Animal Rights and Welfare’, pp. 4-5.
Quoted in Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Welfare’, p. 6.
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All of the grass roots activists I met with, interviewed and observed,
without exception, advocated a ‘rights’ approach based on direct
action. None of the people involved in grass roots animal rights felt
the need to belong to any other larger (more mainstream?) animal
rights charities. As one animal rights activist explained when asked
if she was a member of any of the larger animal rights groups:
Not cos I’m not interested but I think I’m more
useful here. The BUAV and the NAVS used to
be really good, used to do a lot for grass roots
stuff but when the raids started happening they
stopped, to the point where they’d make
damaging statements about grass roots in the
press. They criticize us and don’t use the
opportunity to criticize vivisection or whatever
it is. They don’t have to condone it but they
don’t have to condemn it either. I think that’s
really damaging cos it’s not helping animals to
do that. It gives the press the idea that it is just a
bunch of extremists rather than talking through
the issues. That’s why I can’t be bothered with
it. I think it’s a shame to split it. I wouldn’t
condemn what they do either cos I don’t think
we should split it, we all want the same things.
It’s just a shame that they feel they have to
condemn us.
Similarly the ALF advocates a strict animal rights approach as
explained in the animal rights magazine Arkangel:
The Animal Liberation Front carries out direct
action against animal abuse, rescuing animals
and causing financial loss to animal abusers,
usually through the damage and destruction of
property. Their short term aim is to rescue as
many animals as possible and directly disrupt
the practice of animal abuse; their long term
aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing
animal abuse companies and individuals out of
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business. It is a non-violent campaign, activists
taking precautions not to harm any person or
animal. Because ALF actions are against the
law. Activists work anonymously, either in
groups or individually, and do not have a
central contact address or any centralized
organization or co-ordination. 23
Although the ALF members, according to the statement above, have
immediate and long term goals, their immediate goals could never
be seen to fall into the category of welfarism, and neither could their
philosophy be summed up by the hybrid approach of ‘new
welfarism’.
The ALF is not the only direct action animal rights group in Britain
but it is certainly one of the more infamous if for nothing else than
its unfavourable media treatment over the last 20 years or so. The
ALF claim that anyone who carries out actions in line with ALF
guidelines designed to further animal rights and who is a vegetarian
or vegan can consider him/herself a member of the ALF. The ALF
guidelines are:
• to liberate animals from places of abuse, ie.
laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc.,
and place them in good homes where they
may live out their natural lives, free from
suffering
• to inflict economic damage on those who
profit from the misery and exploitation of
animals
• to reveal the horror and atrocities committed
against animals behind locked doors, by
performing non-violent, direct actions and
liberations

23 F. Wicklund, (website), Animal Rights in Britain’, (1996),
http://envirolink.org/arrs/ar_uk.html.
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• to take all necessary precautions against
harming any animal, human and non-human
This means, technically, that all the people involved in the animal
rights meetings I attended could consider themselves members of
the ALF if they so chose. I raise this issue not to cash in on the
sensationalism surrounding the ALF but to offer an idea of the
philosophy behind animal protection groups which frequently use
direct action groups and to make the point that it could not be
considered ‘new welfarism’.
The activists I met all played a huge part in direct action in one way
or another, from actively helping on hunt sabs and taking part in
demonstrations whose sole purpose was to destroy property, to
helping out at money raising and petition signing stalls. The ethos of
direct action was so strong within the group that those who attended
meetings and did not take part in any action were marginalised and
always maintained the status of ‘outsider.’ One activist who was
involved in the various campaigns on a daily basis explained that
she felt guilty about not doing enough even though she was one of
the most committed members of the group: ‘I don’t feel as though
I’m doing enough because there’s so much to do I suppose. Ideally
I’d like to be everywhere and do everything but you can’t.’
None of the activists I met could be considered ‘new welfarists’ since
they not only believed in the philosophy of animal rights and
believed in acting in line with these philosophies but because they
also openly eschewed the notion of animal welfare:
Welfare stops short of what I want. It’s asking
for compromise and I don’t like that. I don’t
want to say can that hen have a bigger cage, or
can you stop eating meat but keep drinking
milk. It seems like a betrayal to animals. A lot
of the welfare stuff is about living a normal life
as well, campaigning about cruelty but not
making enough changes in your life to support
that whereas rights demands a change in your
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lifestyle. What you eat, drink, wear and even
think all have to change.
In line with this notion that a commitment to animal rights involves
a change in lifestyle comes the idea that supporting animal rights,
unlike supporting animal welfare, is critical of much more than
cruelty/wrongdoings to animals and that there is a series of
interlocking oppressions which form the root cause of animal
exploitation.
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One crow, sorrow
Simone Poirier-Bures

S

omething moved in the grass at the edge of the road. Black
against bright green. A young crow. It fanned its wings as I
approached and tried to scurry into the tall weeds. A fledgling
pushed out of the nest too soon, perhaps? Its tail feathers
looked rumpled, mangled. My first impulse was rescue: I would
bring it home, nurse it, maybe keep it as a pet.
It resisted at first, so I spoke to it softly. When I picked it up, it stared
at me sideways, the way birds do, with a dark, purplish-grey eye.
Then it curled a foot around my little finger - it felt like the grasp of a
baby's hand. We were more than a mile from my house, so we began
walking. The crow made half-hearted struggling movements, but
after a few moments it settled its throat against my hands, so I could
feel the warm thud of its pulse. It smelled, oddly, of wet dog. What
had happened? Most likely it had been struck by a car, misjudging
the speed of some roaring machine hurtling itself down this busy
road. I thought of the things a young crow would need to learn to
survive in this world. Velocity. Who was a friend? Who wasn't?
I tried to imagine how the crow must feel, being carried like this. It
could hear the usual sounds - the chirping of other birds, the soft
swishing of the leaves and pine branches, the distant bark of a dog.
But the feel of my hands around it, the sound of my breathing, were
alien sensations. I thought of rabbits and rodents being borne away
by a hawk or an owl. For them such flights always end in death.
Crows fly, so what could being carried mean to it? It could not
imagine its own death in the way that humans do, though animals
and birds clearly sense danger and know fear. This crow, however,
seemed to be practicing Zen. Resting serenely, breathing low and
steadily, it seemed ready to accept whatever befell it. Now and then
it blinked, its veiled eye turning milky blue.
I thought of many things during the 20 minutes I carried the crow.
But mostly, I felt its presence, the satiny feel of its feathers, the pulse
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of its warm life. I felt privileged to be on such intimate terms with a
creature who had never before been touched by a human, who
experienced the world in a completely different way than I did, and
who now rested peacefully in my hands.
As we entered my garage, the crow tensed, gripping my finger more
tightly. I placed it gently in a laundry basket with a pan of water,
and covered the basket with a screen. Because the crow was agitated
now, I draped an old table cloth over the basket, the way people
cover a parrot's cage, to calm it. I thought of bringing it food, but
what did crows eat? I knew about carrion, but couldn't imagine
myself scraping the remains of dead things off the road. What else?
Worms? Corn?
My husband, I was sure, would know. When he came home, an hour
or so later, we lifted the cloth. The crow partly opened its wings—
the basket was too narrow for its full wingspread—and stared at us
warily. The water in the pan had turned bloody, as had a small pool
on the bottom of the basket. Blood dripped slowly from the crow's
hindquarters. This startled me, as the crow had not bled earlier.
Perhaps the way I'd held it had kept the wound closed.
My husband looked at the crow and shook his head. There was
nothing we could do for it. I picked up the crow and looked into its
purplish-grey eye, into its tiny black pupil, and told it it was dying.
It seemed to know. But it didn't thrash or cry out as humans do in
pain, so it was hard to tell if it was suffering; it simply watched us,
with that one wary eye. And every three seconds or so a thick drop
of dark red blood fell from its body.
Would it be more humane to give it a quick death, I wondered. My
husband, who kills and eats fish and wild ducks and the occasional
deer, said he couldn't bring himself to kill it. I doubted that I could
either. But if we left the crow in the basket and let nature take its
course, the crow would die in a strange human enclosure, confused
and fearful, unable, even, to stretch its wings. How, then, to give it a
good death?
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I thought of my own death, what I would want. I would like to feel
death come and not fear it. I would have death touch me gently,
surrounded by the things and people I love. So I carried the crow out
to the field behind our house, down through the tall grasses, to the
huge blue spruce. Under the low branches where it was shady and
cool, out of easy view of hawks or cats, I smoothed out an area and
laid the crow there. It blinked at me and kept very still.
All afternoon I pictured the crow in its sheltered nook under the
fragrant branches, among the grasses and wildflowers. From its cool,
shady bed it could watch the drifting sunlight, hear the humming of
insects, the conversations of birds overhead. And softly, softly, death
would come, like a shifting shadow, like dappled light, like wind
moving slowly through the trees.
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In what respects, if any, should the
primates be equal?
Elizabeth Murphy

H

uman beings are undoubtedly blessed with the most
extraordinary gift of nature—the most sophisticated
consciousness. However, it is also this superb awareness
which shackles some Homo sapiens with an abject
humiliation - an irrational horror of their animality. The human
animals’ realisation of their biological, hence finite, condition can
impel them to fearfully disclaim their ancestry and strive to
'transcend' their natural condition. The human species' claim to
superior physical and moral status in the natural world on the basis
of either their 'unique' rationality, dignity or worth, is specious.
Traditional western philosophical, religious, scientific and literary
ideologies have initiated and sustained a myth that the other
animals, including the Great Apes other than Homo sapiens, are
inferior members of the natural world. These ideologies have
contributed to our primate cousins’ exclusion from the opportunity
to relish a life suffused with physical, intellectual and emotional
dignity.
In this article I intend to briefly appraise some of the areas within
western traditional ideologies which have perpetuated the attitude
that all animals, other than human, are not entitled to be treated with
even the minimal degree of respect accorded to some human beings.
I also intend to evaluate contemporary sources which indicate that in
view of recent field studies and scientific research on the non-human
primates, existing objections to the extension of equality (implying
moral obligations) to the other primates 1 can no longer be sustained.
Recorded attempts of the search by western scholars for an
explanation of the origins of the species, particularly the existence
1 References in this article to 'the other primates', 'non-human primates', 'other
Great Apes' refer to those primates other than human presently taxonomically
categorised within the order Hominoidea as chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans.
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and nature of the human species, reveal that theories have been
swayed either by disarming ignorance or misplaced conceit. From
audacious beginnings as humble ‘prickly barks’ 2 (c.500BC), the
human animal has become elevated in status to the extent that
humans generally consider themselves to be the sublime result of the
biological evolutionary process. The notion of the human animal's
supremacy over inanimate and all other animate living forms gained
credence, in part, because of the acceptance of the influential works
of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322BC). 3
Following his categorisations differentiating plants, animals and
humans, Aristotle concluded that what clearly differentiates humans
from the other animals is that the human alone, of all animate things,
has the capacity to reason. Whilst other animal beings and plants
have the ability to perceive or respond to environmental factors,
they do not have consciousness, that is, they lack self-awareness and
the ability to reason abstractly. Rather than use reason, plants
respond to stimuli, and animals 'obey their instincts'. 4
Furthermore, Aristotle's claim of the existence of a 'principle of rule
and subordination in nature at large' also contributed to sanctioning
the idea that animals exist without any intrinsic worth. 5
Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and
animals to give it to (men). Animals...serve to
furnish man not only with food, but also with
other comforts...Accordingly, as nature makes
nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must
have been made by nature for the sake of men. 6

Anaximander, quoted by Plutarch, in Early Greek Philosophy, J. Barnes, (Penguin,
London, 1987), p. 73.
3 Aristotle, 'Parts of Animals' in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Book
1, Chapter 1, 645b, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 998.
4 Aristotle, Politics, trans E. Barber, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), I.V., 9,
p. 6.
5 ibid., V, 1, p. 91.
6 In this article, the generic 'men' or 'man' is retained solely for the purpose of
quoting ad verbatim. See Aristotle, Politics, V111, p. 95.
2
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As animals exist within nature without the capacity to reason (being
guided instead by instincts) they are, therefore, provided by nature
for the use of the human being.
Apart from the influence of ancient Greek writers such as Aristotle,
the writings of the ancient Hebrews and later of Christian
theologians were also instrumental in the formation of a demeaning
attitude towards the other animals within western culture. In the
ancient Hebrew text The First Book of Moses, called Genesis 7, two
aspects in particular warrant attention. The account of the origin of
the human within the world: 'So God created man in his own image,
in the image of God created he him; male and female created he
them.' 8 reflects an existing cultural belief in the pre-eminence of the
human species, especially the male of the species. Furthermore,
instructions to humans to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea,
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth
upon the earth' 9 authorises humans to adopt authority over all the
animals.
Later Christian doctrines also reflect the disparate relationship
between humans and the animals. In his work Summa Theologica, St.
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) advises 'There is no sin in using a
thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such
that the imperfect are for the perfect...things, like plants which
merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for
man.' 10 In addition, Aquinas' ruling 'it matters not how man behaves
to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power' 11
would have undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing cultural beliefs
of the mental and moral supremacy of the human and exacerbated
existing exploitative practices against the animals. As a result of
these doctrines, the other Great Apes, in particular, have been
especially maligned within western cultural discourse and
symbolism.

Genesis, The Holy Bible, (King James version, 1611), pp. 5-64.
ibid., 1:27, p. 6.
9 ibid., 1:28, p. 6.
10 Aquinas, from ‘Summa Theologica’, quoted in Animal Liberation, P. Singer,
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 211.
11 ibid., p. 213.
7
8
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Of all the animals, the non-human primate has been most 'deeply
involved in western ideas on human nature, morals and origins' 12
and consequently occupies a prominent, yet paradoxical, position
within western cultural symbolism. In traditional eastern cultures
monkeys and apes were accorded respect as they were considered to
be mediators between the human and a deity, or alternatively were
personified and revered as a deity. 13 In comparison, apart from a
period in the eighteenth century when apes were pictured as gentle,
'human-like creatures', western culture has tended to stereotype the
primates as savage, brutal beings; beings personifying licentious or
evil behaviours—behaviours deemed as uncivilised or immoral
within human societies. Furthermore, the primates were generally
the objects of derision, being perceived as either intriguing
zoological exhibits or as creatures deserving extermination. 14
The non-human primates have long endured being the 'object' of
human fascination. Fascination itself, if applied with consideration
and courtesy towards the being who is viewed, is not necessarily a
problem. However, the present ambiguous biological 15 and moral
standing of the other primates within western communities is not a
reflection of our society's 'fascination with the primates', but rather
an attitude which reflects the fact that our fascination has mostly
been perverse. Unlike the other animals, however, the non-human
primates do occupy a unique position in the psyche of humans and
in the natural world. To the consternation of some humans, the nonhuman primates alone of all animals other than human, most
resemble in form and behaviour the human animal. 'They are neither
completely human, nor completely animal, but both at once'. None
but the other primates 'inhabit the margins of humanity' 16, a

R. Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, in The Great Ape Project, eds., P. Cavalieri & P.
Singer, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), p. 129.
13 ibid., pp. 129-130.
14 ibid., p. 131.
15 I am of the opinion that the present taxonomical categorisation of the
chimpanzee primate and the human primate does not honestly reflect the human's
kin relationship to them. In evolutionary terms, the chimpanzee and the human
share a 'recent' common ancestor, are genetically dissimilar by less than 1% and yet
are classified within separate families, namely Pongidae and Hominidae
respectively.
16 Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, p. 130.
12
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collective of privileged primates reluctant to accept, let alone
approve, a change in status for our cousins from 'object' to subject.
The realisation within recent times of the Great Ape's capacity to be
self-aware, to reason and to feel has gradually altered, to a degree,
cultural perception of them and given rise to the dilemma regarding
their disenfranchisement from the moral domain. The rigid
distinction traditionally assumed to exist between the human and
other animals has proved difficult to maintain, especially in light of
indisputable evidence of the primate origins of humankind. 17 In
addition, a more sophisticated understanding gained through the
scientific disciplines including genetics and molecular biology has
led to a reappraisal of the existing taxonomic systems, particularly
with regard to the human/animal distinction. Furthermore, recent
field studies and scientific research have contributed to scientific and
ethical challenges to existing theories and beliefs in relation to our
kinship with, and our unethical treatment of, the other Great Apes.
Results from studies conducted to assess the cognitive abilities of the
primates have issued a challenge to the most cherished 'hallmark' of
the human—the ability to reason. The ability to reason arises from
the faculty of consciousness, the origin of the experiences referred to
as thought, self-awareness, emotions, intentionality etc. The human's
claim to be entitled to occupy a privileged and dominant position
within the natural world, including the animal kingdom, is based
upon the belief that the human animal alone has the 'unique' ability
to reason. This claim, however, is contested by researchers Roger
Fouts and Deborah Fouts 18 following their studies with chimpanzee
primates. The researchers claim that demonstrations of an array of a
complex set of abilities, and spontaneous communication amongst
themselves and with human researchers, verifies the undeniable
existence, within the chimpanzee primates, of non-human thought.

Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, (Faber & Faber, London, (1889), 1979).
Whilst Darwin did not emphatically state that the human being was indeed an ape
(p. 217) his explication of the origins of vegetative and animal species (being both a
biological and an evolutionary process) resulted in altered cultural perceptions
and eventual scientific acceptance of the primate origins of humankind.
18 R.S. Fouts and D.H. Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', in Cavalieri &
Singer, The Great Ape Project, pp. 28-41.
17
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In one particular investigation 19 of the cognitive abilities of
chimpanzees, Fouts and Fouts conducted a remote videotaped study
of chimpanzees using American sign language in over five thousand
instances. According to Fouts and Fouts, demonstrations of certain
behaviours previously considered unique to the human and
associated with the human's reasoning process were demonstrated
to be present within the chimpanzees. For example, like humans,
chimpanzees are able to use what is referred to as 'referential
communication', that is, the chimpanzees have the ability to think
about, and comment on things and events in their environment. In
addition, the employment of 'informative signing' indicates that the
chimpanzees are able to ask for things not in their immediate
environment. 20 The ability to refer to things and events not in an
immediate environment was previously thought to be an ability that
only humans are capable of possessing. Also, the use by the
chimpanzee subjects of 'expressive signing' to spontaneously express
an emotion when upset or excited by something 21 is an indication
that chimpanzees, as well as humans, subjectively experience
emotions. Furthermore, according to Fouts and Fouts, chimpanzees
not only displayed evidence of imagination and memory but are
able, following the acquisition of human sign language, to pass the
language on to following generations. 22
It is apparent from results of this particular study by Fouts and Fouts
that chimpanzee beings are able not only to communicate within
their own kind, but possess the capacity to reason to the extent that
they have the ability to 'adopt' a human language to reciprocate the
human's attempt to communicate with them. The study further
indicates that chimpanzee beings are capable of acting with a sense
of purpose, that is, intentionally, and that they too experience
emotions. The study therefore negates the human being's claim to
what was previously considered an ability unique to the human—
reason. It also provides an opportunity to challenge another human
presumption: on the basis that humans are biologically unique
because of their capacity to reason and are therefore intrinsically
ibid., pp. 33-39.
Fouts and Fouts, ‘Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language’, p. 35.
21 ibid., pp. 35-36.
22 ibid., pp. 36-39.
19
20
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valuable, the human alone of all creatures is the sole creature eligible
and entitled to claim the right to a life infused with physical,
intellectual and emotional dignity.
If acceptance into the community of equals is on the proviso that one
be a conscious being, that is a being able to reason, having the
capacity to feel emotions, feel pain and suffering, and be self-aware,
then the evidence from the above study alone indicates that calls to
include the other Great Apes within the human moral domain are
not based upon theoretical delusion or misplaced sentimentality, but
upon empirically verifiable facts.
According to the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 23 the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world depends upon
recognition of not only the inherent dignity of the human being but
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family. 24 The fundamental rights accorded to humans: 'Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment'
(Articles 3 and 5) 25, were intended as a common standard by which
nations could promote respect for the intrinsic value of all members
of their communities and the human species universally. These
particular rights are vital to human beings, particularly if they are
living within societies reluctant to recognise the intrinsic worth of an
individual. Without them their hopes of living a life with some sense
of security and general well-being are diminished.
Needless to say, if the human scientific establishment eventually
managed to recognise the human being’s kinship with the other
Great Apes, the human moral community also needs to do some
research. The universal human moral community is in a position to
use its moral agency to recognise that a number of 'our family' are
being denied the opportunity to exercise their inalienable rights to
life, liberty and freedom from torture.

23 The General Assembly, United Nations, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights'
(1948), in Human Rights, C. Freeman, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990), pp. 66-68.
24 ibid., p. 66.
25 ibid., p. 11.
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In 'A Declaration on the Great Apes' 26, a group of persons concerned
with the current status and plight of the other Great Apes is
lobbying for the 'extension of the community of equals to include all
great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans'. 27
The 'community of equals' is defined as the moral community within
which its members accept certain basic moral principles or rights as
governing their relations with each other and which are enforceable
at law. 28 Amongst these principles or rights are included:
• The Right to Life
The lives of members of the community of
equals are to be protected. Members of the
community of equals may not be killed
except in very strictly defined circumstances,
for example, self-defence.
• The Protection of Individual Liberty
Members of the community of equals are not
to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.
• The Prohibition of Torture
The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a
member of the community of equals, either
wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others,
is
regarded as torture, and is wrong. 29
As mentioned previously, of all the Great Apes, only the human ape
is protected by legislation against denial of the above three basic
rights. The human ape also has recourse to anti-discrimination laws,
unlike our cousins, who are dependent upon others to combat the
crime of 'speciesism'.

ibid., p. 11.
ibid., p. 4.
28 ibid., p. 4.
29 ibid.
26
27
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Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in
favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against
those of members of other species'. 30 Given that there are differences
between humans and non-human primates, and that the capacity to
reason within the other primates is not as 'sophisticated' as the
humans' ability to reason, it needs to be recognised that there are
also members of the human community with varying degrees of
mental capacity. 31
Human individuals such as infants, comatose and brain-damaged
persons and those afflicted with mental illness are protected by
statutory rights from being excluded from the human moral
community regardless of their mental capacities and/or ability to
exercise their autonomy. 'If possessing a higher degree of
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his(sic)
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the
same purpose?'. 32 It stands to reason that on the basis that the other
Great Apes possess consciousness, self-awareness, and have the
capacity to reason and experience emotions, they are just as entitled
to be included within the community of equals as are the able and
less abled members of our species.
It is beyond dispute that the primates, including the human, share a
specific morphological feature - the central nervous system - a
product of which is the physical experience of pain. Considering that
it has been scientifically proven that the other primates also have
self-awareness, one could safely infer that they, along with the
human primate, share not only the feeling of pain but also the
experience of misery arising as a result of it. Apart from
physiological evidence, common sense should enable the human
species to acknowledge that suffering as a result of experiencing
pain is an experience common to both us and the other primates.
This knowledge does not generally appear, however, to impel

P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, (Jonathan
Cape, London, 1976), p. 7.
31 Heta Hayry and Matti Hayry, 'Who's Like Us?', in Cavalieri & Singer, The Great
Ape Project, p. 176.
32 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7.
30
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human beings to exercise their moral agency in a manner humane to
our kin.
A human being in possession of his/her faculty of consciousness is
aware that there is a limit to the endurance of pain. Upon reaching a
point at which endurance is insufferable, at least the human can
physically and verbally articulate his/her anguish. Recognition of the
commonality of the experience of misery resulting from suffering
pain does not appear to be a primary concern in the attitude of some
humans conducting experiments upon other sentient animals,
including the other primates. As Singer has succinctly noted ‘[w]hile
we overlook our savagery, we exaggerate that of other animals’. 33
The human species, let alone a human community of equals, is
somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of nations uniting and declaring a
charter of universal human rights, historically, some western
individuals and their societies have not always managed to behave
in an egalitarian manner. The subjugation of women and
enslavement or genocide of indigenous peoples, for instance, are
prime examples of some peoples' attitudes to certain members of the
species. Human resistance to change is understandable to the degree
that those occupying positions of power and dominance are
reluctant to alter the 'status quo' and forgo their privileges. Some
humans’ propensity to assume a recalcitrant attitude is, I believe,
rather accurately reflected in the following quote:
Man usually either considers himself a selfmade animal and consequently adores his
maker, or assumes himself to be the creation of
a supreme intelligence, for which the latter is
alternately congratulated and blamed. An
attitude of humility, abasement, contrition, and
apology for its shortcomings is thoroughly
uncharacteristic of the species Homo sapiens,
except as a manifestation of religion. I am
convinced that this most salutary of religious
attitudes should be carried over into science.

33

Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 248.
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Man should confess his evolutionary
deficiencies, and resolve that, in future, he will
try to be a better animal. 34
Given that our understanding of biological beings has advanced,
especially since the advent of molecular biology, and given the
scientific evidence of the existence of reason and self-awareness in
the non-human primates, contemporary society is now in a position
to seriously consider evidence repudiating former views which were
detrimental to the well being of the primates. As Hooton states, the
human animal could indeed be a better animal. Rather than
presuming that Homo sapiens is positioned at the pinnacle of the
evolutionary process, the human species could extend consideration
to all the other animals. The other animals could be viewed as
successful adaptors of their specific species, animals who too can
reason and feel. At the very least, the other Great Apes could be
extended the courtesy of being treated as the subjects they are and
receive their due entitlements of 'the right to life, the protection of
individual liberty and freedom from torture'. 35
As the present situation stands, intervention in the non-human
primates' lives in human controlled situations is not without
attendant complications. It is obvious upon reading the concerned,
even passionate, accounts 36 of their encounters with the other Great
Apes, that some researchers, observers and carers hold these special
Beings in the highest esteem. However, by imparting specifically
human cultural behaviours and concepts to the other primates there
is, I believe, the possibility of some members of the human species
attempting to impose our culture upon them.
Our level of awareness, apart from bringing us our most exquisite
joys, also brings us our greatest angst and, at times, awesome
sorrow.

E.A. Hooton, from ‘Apes, Men and Morons’ (1937), quoted in The Evolution of
Evil, T. Anders, (Open Court, Illinois, 1994),p. 73.
35 The Editors and Contributors, ‘A Declaration on Great Apes’, Cavalieri & Singer,
The Great Ape Project, p.4.
36 ibid., pp. 1-312.
34
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What does it mean to be a self-conscious animal?
The idea is ludicrous, if it is not monstrous. It
means to know that one is food for worms. This
is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to
have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner
feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life
and self-expression—and with all this yet to
die. 37
Imposition of the 'condition' known as human upon the other Great
Apes would be highly questionable, if not inhumane. Far better they,
our cousins relish their freedom under their canopies and skies
we be relieved of reading their suffering with
mad, bleeding eyes.
E.M.
Bernard Rollin's inspirational appeal for the extension of the right to
life, liberty and freedom from torture to the non-human primates:
We should let them be...(with) their
inexhaustible wonders and grandeur, And let
the dictum be proclaimed—know without
hunting, see without manipulating, cherish in
itself, not for myself 38
captures a notion of equality already implicit in feminist ethics. It is
one, I believe, which could foster not only acceptance of, but a
universal respect for, all living beings regardless of sex, gender, race
or species.
One would hope with the approaching millennium and the
corresponding two thousandth anniversary of the western ethical
system - which claims mercy to be one of its principal tenets - the
human species would unfetter, from the criminal arena of
speciesism, our primate cousins.
E. Becker, quoted in T. Anders, The Evolution of Evil, p. 179.
B.E. Rollin, 'The Ascent of Apes - Broadening the Moral Community', in
Cavalieri & Singer, The Great Ape Project, p. 216.
37
38
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For my cousins -

(especially 'the Girls')
My cousins are wailing, waiting
The earth is listening, weeping
I am hearing, hurting
Learning, believing
Planning.
E.M.
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Book Reviews
Ethical approaches to animal-based science: Proceedings of the Joint
ANZCCART/NAEAC Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20
September, 1977, v + 159pp, ANZCCART, New Zealand, 1998.
The Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in
Research and Teaching (ANZCCART) is a body active in the
promotion of ethical positions in relation to animal experimentation
while continuing to espouse the benefits of such experimentation. In
1997 with the (New Zealand) National Animal Ethics Advisory
Committee, ANZCCART convened a Conference on this area and
Ethical approaches of animal-based science contains the Conference
papers.
There are six key themes in these papers. In the first contributors
explore the value systems which might operate in ‘animal-based
science’. The expression has a rather ominous ring as it suggests that
the use of animals is necessary to the science to such an extent that
the science could not exist without them. Indeed the papers in this
section do seem to take it as given that animals will always be used
in experimentation in science but in a gentle way they do succeed in
at least showing how ethics has a place in science, a position which
still does not have complete acceptance in the scientific community.
Two papers take up the topic of societal consensus, public policy and
animal welfare awareness looking at public opposition to
experimentation and how this has promoted ‘respect for individual
animals, adherence to the Three Rs, and competent analgesia,
anaesthesia, and after-care.’ (p. 49) It probably would be true to say
there there is no societal consensus on this issue. However the
opposition discussed is portrayed as rather simple minded. For
instance Royce Elliott states that ‘It is still contended that animal
experimentation has been of no benefit to humans’. (p. 50) One does
not have to accept this belief, in order to consistently oppose such
experimentation. It is possible to agree that there have been
enormous benefits but argue for instance that humans have now
reached a state of understanding and sensitivity towards other
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beings such that experimenting on them appears a very undesirable
option.
The third theme deals with the recognition of animal pain and
suffering and refinements of techniques to minimize both of these.
This is well done. A short paper looks at how the Three Rs are
promoted. This is mainly on the functioning of ethics committees.
Some criticisms are mentioned and some interesting legal reforms
suggested. The following grouping of papers explores the operation
of animal ethics committees further. While some pertinent points are
made the question about whether alternatives to animal research are
sufficiently well promoted is not adequately addressed, yet
replacement is one of the Three Rs which many writers say they
support.
The fifth theme is on vertebrate pests (eg possums, goats, pigs and
deer) and their control. These are important concerns in Australia
and New Zealand, with no easy answers. The final section contains
an interesting collection of papers on animal welfare, putting animal
interests first, people first, science first or the environment first.
Denise Russell

Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds, 230pp. Temple University
Press, Philadelphia, 1997.
In Hearts and Minds Julian McAllister Groves examines the dynamics
of a localised political debate centred around the use of animals in
medical experiments at an unnamed US university. The book focuses
on two active groups in the debate, an anti-animal experimentation
group called Animals Anon and a group of researchers who use
animals in their studies and who began responding to the protests
staged by Animals Anon. Not aiming to persuade the reader to one
side of the debate or the other, Groves is interested rather in how the
participants in the debate feel about animals in research, ‘why they
feel the way they do, and how they feel about their feelings’ (p. vii)
and to this end offers a vivid and interesting account of a range of
activists and scientists, and their interactions.
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He begins by outlining the main theoretical tool of the book; the
notion of shame, which he sees as central to both ‘sides’ of the
debate. The work of Thomas Scheff is used to identify the presence
of shame in the motives and responses of both animal experimenters
and protesters alike, this being the first of several similarities Groves
constructs between the two groups. He locates himself at length
within the debate by expressing sympathy toward Animals Anon
and towards ‘animal rights’ in general though he does not make
clear precisely what his views on animal experimentation are.
In chapter two Groves identifies what becomes for him a major
dilemma in human/animal interaction, that is the simultaneous use
of animals for human purposes and the keeping of pets (where
strong affective ties to the pets are experienced). How is it that
humans can both love and consume animals? To some, of course, the
keeping of pets and the consumption of animals as food and as
scientific and technological aids is in no way a contradiction, rather,
both may be seen as aspects of an instrumentalist view of animals as
available to meet the needs and desires of humans; for food, freedom
from disease or companionship. This account of animal use is not
investigated however, and the perceived dilemma persists as a
theme throughout the book, supporting the primary notion of
shame.
The ‘dilemma’ is particularly evident in Groves’ account of the
members of Animals Anon, many of whom seem equally concerned
with the simultaneous use of animals as commodities and as pets.
Members are portrayed as primarily, though not exclusively, middle
class women, pet lovers whose initial motivation as a group began
over the routine sale of impounded pets to animal experimenters at
the university. In relation to this focus on pets, Groves notes
amongst these members a wariness toward expressions of sentiment
about animals in debating the rights and wrongs of vivisection, and
an awareness that rational argument may be a more effective means
of securing public support. In contrast, Groves suggests, animal
experimenters tend to shy away from scientific or overly rational
argument, emphasising their connectedness with animals and their
sympathy for the plight of their experimental subjects.
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Both ‘sides’ are acutely aware of the strategic nature of their debate
and the need to present themselves in ways that may prove
influential to the public. Groves acknowledges this, though more
consideration of the implications of the debate as a strategic exercise
would have been most welcome. What does it mean that scientists
feel the need to appear more compassionate and emotional while
animal activists want to appear more logical and dispassionate?
Some brief discussion of gender issues is included here, but a deeper
look at the dichotomising of ‘hearts and minds’ both within the
debate and in western culture generally might have yielded valuable
insights. While Groves claims to investigate how people feel about
animals and how they feel about how they feel, by his own account
he is more likely to uncover how they talk about animals and how
they talk about how they feel. The relations between feeling and
talking in this strategic context needs to be carefully examined.
The book argues for a kind of continuity between the animal
experimenters and Animals Anon, suggesting that both groups feel
compassion for animals and do not wish to see them suffer. Groves
recognises that for scientists, this concern is primarily paternalistic,
with scientists viewing themselves as ‘stewards’ of nature while
many members of Animals Anon reject such a relationship. In spite
of this he argues that ‘animal rights activists and animal research
supporters are not as different as they have been made out to be
with regard to their feelings about animals’. (p. 28) As feminists
amongst others know, the difference between paternalistic concern
for the welfare of a dependent and recognition of the inherent
integrity of a being is fundamental. Groves’ failure to adequately
understand the nature and significance of paternalism here relates to
his earlier ‘dilemma’ about consuming animals and keeping them as
pets. Where both consuming and keeping are understood to be
aspects of a paternalistic or ‘stewardly’ approach, there is no
dilemma.
Groves uses his research into Animals Anon (twenty activists) to
generalise about animal activism and to offer insight into ways of
solving
conflict
between
experimenters
and
protesters.
Unfortunately his extrapolation from such a small sample is
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methodologically unjustified and certainly, his descriptions of the
preoccupations and views of some of the activists interviewed
present them as relatively conservative within the ‘animal rights’
political arena. The group is by no means abolitionist in its shared
outlook and as such, requires very different analysis and
intervention than might groups with an abolitionist agenda. Equally,
the theme of shame bears quite differently upon those who eat
animals and keep pets yet oppose animal experimentation,
compared with those equally opposed who do not keep or eat
animals. While Groves creates quite a complex account of the
differences amongst the activists, he notes that the only African
American activist he saw was excluded from his study as ‘atypical’.
(p. 151) His own varied descriptions would suggest that a ‘typical’
activist might be difficult to identify, though as I have noted,
generalisations on his part are by no means eschewed.
Broadly, the book performs an interesting shift away from the issue
of animal experimentation onto the actors involved in the debate, a
shift that is always a risk for those also concerned with the debate
itself, as Groves claims to be. Focusing on the protagonists in a
struggle over issues of suffering, justice or integrity is valuable
where light is shed on the social context around that debate, or on
strategies, their meaning for the culture in which the debate is
played out and thus the potential for just resolution. Groves
concludes by offering advice as to how the conflict between animal
experimenters and protesters could have been resolved, suggesting
that ‘for the grassroots organisations like Animals Anon, it is clear
that small, symbolic concessions to the activists can diffuse the
controversy’. (p. 192) Here, concern for the just resolution of the
issue of experimentation on animals is superceded by the desire to
end conflict per se, without concern for changes to laboratory
practice or improvement in quality of life for the animals. This may
be an effect of the shift away from the issue toward the protagonists,
where the issue is discarded, in favour of a different ‘problem’; the
resolution of conflict between protagonists themselves.
The book ends by focusing on the insights that conflict resolution to
be found in the animal experimentaion debate through accounts of
specific confrontations that might have proved more fruitful if
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handled differently. Clearly, both ‘sides’ are guilty of inconsistencies
both in their material practices and the opinions they profess and
perhaps what is most unsettling about Hearts and Minds is that while
Groves offers suggestions for better ways to respond or
communicate in specific situations, he rarely adequately draws out
the significance of these inconsistencies to the failure of the
situations or makes the inconsistencies central to the problem and its
resolution. I have already noted that the book is not about the issue
of animal experimentation, but about the protagonists in the debate,
so that prolonged analysis of the subjects’ views may not seem to be
appropriate. However, the value of his insights to other contexts is
uncertain. The extent to which the issue of animal exploitation in
medical research can be satisfactorily resolved through diplomacy
more than through material change remains open, particularly in
relation to abolotionist agendas. Certainly, it is not a tactic that
remains untried outside Groves’ research context.
Suzanne Frazer

Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan. Not Only Roars and Rituals:
Communication in Animals, x + 230pp
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998.
The question of enshrining animal rights in law is currently being
debated in the New Zealand parliament. A bill has been proposed
which will recognise primates' fundamental rights not to suffer cruel
and degrading treatment. In an article in the Sydney Morning Herald
reporting this debate, the World Society for the Protection of
Animals is cited as supporting the recognition of apes' rights for the
reason that humans and apes are 97% genetically identical. New
Scientist, however, is quoted as critical of this idea, stating that this
fact of genetic similarity does not justify the recognition of rights.
Interestingly, New Scientist argues that the test of similarity to
humans should instead be based upon language use: ‘Language that
allows thinking about thinking should be the test of similarity to
humans’. 1

1

Sydney Morning Herald, 13.2.99, p. 30.
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Even overlooking the question of the privileging of thinking in this
view (why should thinking about thinking be more important than,
for instance, thinking about feeling, or even feeling about feeling?),
the question of language use in animals is one which has vast
significance for animal rights. A book which deals in detail with
animal communication, then, could have direct political
consequences for the treatment of animals by humans.
The opening statement, ‘Researching animal behaviour is a
humbling experience’, gives the reader a good guide to the approach
of Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan in Not Only Roars and Rituals.
This is a special book because of its rare combination of scientific
learning and detailed up-to-date information with the authors' own
experiences in communicating with animals (from scientific field
trips and from their domestic environment), and their obvious love
and respect for animals. This combination of the personal and the
scientific blends in a highly readable and clear account of issues
around communication across many animal species (from primates
to birds and dolphins, amongst others), and articulates a clear ethical
and scientific position on humans' relation to, and understanding of,
animals.
Rogers' and Kaplan's credentials in the field of animal
communication are impressive. Rogers holds a Personal Chair in
Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour at the University of New
England, Australia, and is the author of over 200 scientific papers
and a number of books (including Minds of Their Own: Thinking and
Awareness in Animals). 2 She is well known for her work in the area of
brain development and function. In 1994 she and Kaplan also coauthored a book on their field study of orang-utans, entitled Orangutans in Borneo. Kaplan is a social scientist and ethologist who has a
special interest in communication in primates and vocalisation in
birds. As becomes clear in the book, she is also very involved in
wildlife rehabilitation, specialising in native bird rehabilitation.
Rogers' and Kaplan's combined experience and knowledge then is
scientific, personal, and practical.

2

Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1997.
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Not Only Roars and Rituals functions as a clear and detailed
introduction to the field of animal communication. Many of its
chapters are issue-based, and cover the questions ‘What is
communication?’, ‘Is animal signalling intentional or unintentional?’
and ‘Do animals learn to communicate, or is communication
genetically based?’. These significant and fundamental questions are
explored with numerous examples both from the scientific literature
and from evidence from the authors' experience in living and
working with animals. Two other chapters focus on communication
in birds and mammals respectively, and there is also a final more
discursive chapter on human-animal relationships. Issues of
scientific methodology and research ethics are addressed in relation
to the research reported in each chapter. Rogers and Kaplan give
concise explanations of how such research is undertaken, note any
problematic ethical considerations, and outline the logic of the
research methodologies. They also suggest further areas of research
in many instances. For the reader without a background in this field,
then, the book's approach is very valuable.
Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by Rogers and
Kaplan is that concerning differences between humans and animals.
In their analysis of animal communication they are interested not
only in the hundreds of interesting facts cited, but also in providing
a point of view on the philosophical and ethical question of the
human/animal distinction. In relation to this, Rogers and Kaplan are
concerned to point out the error of assuming that just because it does
not look as though animals are communicating we can know that
they are not. As they argue, animals can be shown to communicate
in ways which are neither audible nor visible to humans (these
include the use of ultraviolet signals, ultrasonic emissions, odour
emissions and seismic signals). The development of innovative
research techniques (such as the use of sound spectograms, which
can graph the frequencies of animal sounds which are inaudible to
human ears) is necessary here, and Rogers and Kaplan give many
examples.
Even more basic is the issue of whether animals can be said to
communicate in a way that bears any resemblance to human
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communication. Using numerous examples, Rogers and Kaplan
argue that animals do indeed communicate with intention and do
learn to communicate (rather than such communication being simply
a product of genetic programming). Citing the well-known examples
of Alex the parrot (trained by Irene Pepperberg at the University of
Arizona), Washoe the chimpanzee (trained by Allen and Beatrix
Gardner of the University of Nevada) and Kanzi the bonobo (trained
by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh), and others, Rogers and Kaplan
demonstrate that animals can be shown to understand and even to
use human language. This destroys one of the most central
arguments made for the human/animal distinction, namely that
humans use language in a unique way.
Studies of animal-animal communication (as opposed to animalhuman communication) also indicate that the complex use of
language is not a unique human quality. Rogers and Kaplan cite
studies of dolphin and whale communications which show that
these animals not only use unique identifying codes for particular
animals (which are used like names), but that particular groups
share communication elements which are understood only within
their groups and by other members of the same species (thus
forming animal communication cultures). These findings show that
animal communications are not simply genetic but, like human
languages, are learned, individually meaningful, and even cultural.
Roars and Rituals leaves the reader with a clear sense both of the
complexity of scientific research into animal communication and of
the fascinating diversity of communication systems and abilities. My
one criticism of this book is that the stories told in relation to these
are often overly short and leave the reader wanting more details.
The wealth of different tales is great, but it can be a little
monotonous if none of these are developed to any great extent. For
example, we are given tantalising glimpses into Kaplan's work
rehabilitating birds and her resulting knowledge of their
communication systems, but these are glimpses only. On occasion I
would have liked to read fewer examples, but to gain a more
indepth insight into one of the examples cited. The characters of this
book are so interesting, some of them deserve a longer story!
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In general though, the book makes a powerful and important
argument about the complexity of animal interactions and the
problematic nature of any clear animal/human distinction based on
language use, and should be widely read for this reason.
Celia Roberts

Clark, Stephen R. L., Animals and their Moral Standing, viii + 194pp.,
Routledge, London and New York, 1997.
In the introduction to this collection of papers, written over a period
of some twenty years, Stephen Clark draws attention to two aspects
of his work which may be of concern to some readers. First, he
points out that those who seek them may well find inconsistencies in
the papers, and will certainly find some repetition. While this might
be seen as meriting criticism in a continuous work, it would be more
worrying, in this context, if the papers showed no sign of change and
development over time. Such change is quite compatible with an
overall consistency which rests on Clark’s unvarying respect for
animals and concern for their defence.
A single example will serve to illustrate the point above. Four of the
essays deal with the question of rights for animals. All four also
include a discussion of utilitarian theory, and of the significance of
the inclusion of non-human animals in the utilitarian calculation of
the greater good. Although Clark acknowledges that the ‘good
utilitarian’ does not believe in rights, he nevertheless explores ways
in which some utilitarians have been prepared to allow rights to
both humans and other animals, and he explores other theoretical
routes to the same end. At the same time, it becomes quite evident
that Clark, himself, is strongly opposed to utilitarianism which, in
the final essay, ‘Modern Errors, Ancient Virtues’, he identifies as a
principle ‘bereft of rational support’, and he shows little more regard
for rights-based theories. He is not, of course, opposed to rights for
animals, but sees them as being of little significance in practice. One
must therefore ask why Clark has spent so much care in the
examination of views with which he finds himself increasingly at
odds. At one point, Clark seems to suggest that this is simply what
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philosophers do, but there is, of course, a purpose underlying the
activity. It is often productive to engage with those who seek the
same end through different means. It may be even more useful to see
that the same theory can be used to serve quite different ends.
The second matter which Clark brings to our attention in the
introduction is the fact that he writes as a Christian philosopher.
There is little in the following essays which is likely to prove
unpalatable to even the most convinced atheist, but this profession
of faith is still of some interest. For most of its history, Christian
teaching has expressed little concern for the non-human, and Clark
specifically rejects what he speaks of as humanist Christianity. When
he wishes to give examples of ‘ancient virtues’, of a time when there
was more familiarity between human and non-human, it is to the
pre-Christian Scriptures that he turns. These scriptural allusions are,
in any case, rare, and Clark is quite ready for them to be treated as
metaphor, but there is little doubt that his religious faith gives
support to some of his philosophical attitudes, to his confident
realism and to his holistic approach to the care for the biosphere.
What interests me most in this book, however, is not that Clark is a
professed Christian, but that he is a professed zoophile with an
interest in both biology and ethology.
Although I do not wish to underestimate the contribution made by
Peter Singer to the debate on the treatment of animals, I have always
been somewhat disconcerted by his simultaneous dismissal of
‘animal-lovers’ and his insistence that the moral principle of equal
consideration of interests should not be arbitrarily restricted to
members of our own species. It is difficult to see how we can give
any rational consideration of interests to members of a species about
which we know little and care nothing. Like Singer, Clark is fully
aware of the dangers of sentimentalism, but he argues that
sentiment, that is, personal and unreflective attachment or attraction,
may be the prelude to rational discovery. In ‘The Consciousness of
Animals’, he suggests that knowledge arises from a loving attention
to what is knowable, a view that he fully recognises as a rejection of
the postulates of the Enlightenment. It is just such attention to a
creature’s particularity that gives us the hope of discovering what it
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perceives and how it does so, knowledge which would make us the
better able to consider its interests.
Clark does not only link sentiment and knowledge, but argues
strongly that natural sentiments are the necessary roots of morality.
Morality does not develop through the exercise of reason, but
through local and familial concerns for children and friends. As
Clark says, aphoristically, we are moral because we are mammalian,
and there is much evidence to support his view. Behaviour that we
regard as good, care for those in need of care, is to be found in
mammals other than humans, and this care is not always confined to
conspecifics. Certainly, as Clark points out, the human family, from
its beginnings, has included members of other species. Clark is not
suggesting that reason has no part in morality, or that moral
obligation ends with the family, or even at the threshold of the cities
that he sees as the set of households, but, however far our
responsibility extends, even if it is over the whole earth and into
space, our moral sensibility develops in our immediate family and is
extended from there.
There will no doubt be some who find Clark’s views objectionable.
As he, himself, admits, if he is right, it is not possible to quite
eliminate subjective discrimination without destroying the natural
roots of our morality. One might argue that this is accurate
observation rather than theory, but there will be those who seek
greater objectivity and prefer to see morality as the province of
rational adults, presumably human, even if their duty of care
extends to members of other species.
Tom Regan, whose work is discussed in several essays, shares with
Clark the view that there is no discoverable difference between all
humans and all non-humans that would license different moral
treatment, but he attempts to justify this view in a very different
way. Regan makes use of the Kantian notion of the human subject as
end-in-itself and therefore worthy of respect. He notes that for Kant
the subject is a rational subject and that this excludes some human
beings, infants and the senile, for example, and he suggests a
different category, subject-of-a-life, which would include the
previously excluded, both human and other animals. Clark treats
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Regan’s arguments sympathetically, but he points out that the only
rights that all subjects-of-a-life could have seem to be the very
minimal ones of extreme right-wing liberalism. As he says, what
concerns him is not abstract political rights but concrete historical
ones, and he admits, quite frankly, that he is more concerned about
the rights of ‘British beasts’ than about the natural rights of all other
animals. This is wholly in accord with his perception of morality as
having its origins in nature, in the family, and I venture to suggest
that, in the same way, Australian readers of this review are likely to
be concerned about Australian animals. They are the ones closest to
us, the ones with which we are familiar, and the ones with which we,
sometimes reluctantly, share our territory, and these animals may be
the natives who live in our gardens or nearby national parks, the
dogs who sleep at our feet, or the farm animals on display at the
agricultural show.
Although I have attempted to give some indication of the topics
addressed by Clark in this book, I have not been very successful in
conveying the flavour of the work as a whole. Clark has indicated
that he writes as a Christian, but I would suggest that he also writes
as an Aristotelian. The two are, of course, not incompatible, but, in
my view, it is the influence of Aristotle that dominates in this
context. It can be seen in the frequent quotations, in the belief in the
natural origin of the moral law, in the effort to perceive the quiddity
of other animals, which is surely nothing other than Aristotelian
form by another name. Above all, it can be seen in Clark’s constant
effort to engage in constructive dialogue, to find a middle way in the
many disputes which bedevil those who try to think about animals
and about what it is to do good in relation to them.
Felicity Sutcliffe
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Book Notes

Orlans, Barbara R., Beauchamp, Tom L., Dresser, Rebecca, Morton,
David B. and Gluck, John, P., The Human Use of Animals: Case Studies
in Ethical Choice, xi + 330 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
The Human Use of animals is mainly a collection of case studies which
raise ethical issues concerning the use of animals in biomedical
research, cosmetic safety testing, behavioural research, wildlife
research, education, food and farming. It also covers the use of
animals as companions and for religious rites. Biomedical and
behavioural research receive the fullest coverage. The authors try to
expose the strength of argument on both sides. Sometimes this is a
little strained as in the discussion of head trauma studies using
baboons. Also most of these issues deserve to be treated in a broader
framework where the possibility of using alternatives to animals (or
not pursuing the research or life style at all) is treated more
seriously. Nevertheless the authors do succeed in admirably laying
out some of the complexities of the debates over the use of animals.
Skutch, Alexander F., The Minds of Birds, xvi + 183pp., Texas A & M
University Press, College Station, Texas, 1996.
In reports of his detailed observations of birds over many years,
Skutch argues that their mental capacities have been grossly
underestimated. In particular Skutch emphasises the capacity of
birds to recognize other birds and humans. They have good
memories and anticipate the future. They cooperate well, especially
when breeding. They are affectionate and playful. They can be
taught to count, and have a good sense of time. Some use tools. They
appear to have an aesthetic sense, can dissimulate (for instance to
protect their young). Skutch claims that this demands ‘cool
calculation and quick wits’. Pepperberg’s remarkable findings with
the African Grey Parrot are outlined. This is a beautifully written
book, full of fascinating detail with a comprehensive bibliography on
the abilities of birds.
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Russon, Anne, Bard, Kim A., Parker, Sue Taylor, eds., Reaching into
thought : The minds of the great apes, xii + 464pp., Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
Reaching into Thought contains 19 articles from psychologists and
anthropologists on the mental abilities of the great apes and
monkeys. Some classic studies are here, for instance Tetsuro
Matsuzawa and Gen Yamakoshi’s comparison of chimpanzee
material culture between Bossou and Nimba, West Africa and
Christophe Boesch’s summation of the evidence gathered from the
wild supporting the notion of a culture in chimpanzees. The
collection also contains one of the best philosophical articles on what
self-awareness or self-knowledge might consist in when considering
humans, apes and monkeys. Other articles take up issues such as
tool use, imitation, pretence and chimpanzees use of rules. This
book is a serious challenge to anyone denying the capacity of great
apes to think.
Mech, L. David, Adams, Layne G., Meier, Thomas J., Burch, John
W. and Dale, Bruce W., The Wolves of Denali, x + 238pp., University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998.
Denali is a National Park in Alaska and the wolves there form one of
the largest protected populations in the world. Mech and his team
have been studying these wolves for nine years and The Wolves of
Denali presents the results from research in 1986 to 1994 in a detailed
yet accessible manner. The findings give an excellent basis for
thinking about issues such as the reintroduction of wolves into
national parks in the United States, the effect of wolves on prey
populations such as caribou in Alaska, the value of national parks to
animals, the social relationships between wolves and their
intelligence.
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